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Financial Inability and the
Default Termination of
Defense Supply Contracts:
A Small Business Case Study
The allocation of a fair proportion of defense procurement
to small business is a continuing problem of national eco-
nomic policy. Perhaps the greatest single barrier for small-
business contractors is the need for adequate financial
resources. In this Article, Lieutenant Speidel examines the
various forms of financial assistance available to small busi-
ness with an eye to their effectiveness in the face of im-
minent default due to financial inability. He concludes that
neither the Defense Contract Financing Regulations nor the
Small Business Act, as presently implemented, affords ade-
quate assistance to small businesses which encounter private
financing problems after performance of their contracts has
commenced. Lieutenant Speidel suggests that small busi-
nesses bidding on defense contracts should be able to estab-
lish their credit with the Small Business Administration
regardless of the apparent availability of private financing,
thereby averting the administrative delays involved in
changing from private to public financing. He also suggests
that the Government should apply broader concepts of
excusability to excuse defaults traceable to wrongful denial
of private credit.
Lt. Richard E. Speidel*
I. INTMODUCTION
The performance of Defense Department fixed-price supply con-
tracts 1 is a challenging task. Defense procurement is voluminous in
* First Lt., JAGC; Member of the Faculty, The Judge Advocate General's School,
U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia; LL.B. 1957, University of Cincinnati; LL.M.
1958, Northwestern University. The opinions and conclusions presented in this
Article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of The
Judge Advocate General's School, the Department of the Army, or any other govern-
mental agency.
1. As the terminology suggests, these contracts are essentially fixed in price; how-
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quantity and complex in nature.2 Performance of defense contracts
frequently requires specialized property and know-how, continuing
research and development, and a willingness to assume unique busi-
ness risks which add uncertainty to pricing. All of these factors have
contributed to an increasing concentration of the defense dollar in
the hands of large contractors,3 and have precipitated a full-scale
effort by Congress and the military departments to increase the num-
ber of prime contractors and subcontractors willing and able to
satisfy the Government's defense needs.4 A principal part of this
effort has been devoted to securing for small businesses' an equi-
ever, they may provide for a redetermination of the contract price. Fixed-price
supply contracts are awarded either through formal advertising or through negotia-
tion. Armed Services Procurement Regulation (hereafter cited as "A.S.P.R.") § 7-102,
2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ff 32663 (1959).
2. Spending for national security is between 40 and 45 billion dollars a year, or
approximately 10% of the gross national product. The largest part of the 25 billion
dollars spent by the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1959 was used for research
and development, and for the production of complex military weapons and equip-
ment which had no commercial counterpart. See D, aRT'mENr oF DE-NsE, PNo-
cuREmENT PPESENTATiON To am PocuREm:ENT SuBco~urrTEE OF THE SENATE
Com u=Irr ON Aum.sm SERvicEs 1-2 (1960). See also Weidenbaum, The Timing
of the Economic Impact of Government Spending, 12 NAT'L TAX J. 79 (1959);
and Novick & Springer, Economics of Defense Procurement and Small Business, 24
LAw & CoNrTSm. PaoB. 118 (1959).
3. The general trend toward business concentration is clearly reflected in de-
fense procurement. In 1959, 78.8% of the total dollar volume of defense prime con-
tracts over $10,000 was shared by 100 contractors, and 21% of the total dollar
volume was awarded to only four contractors. During fiscal year 1959, contracts
comprising only 16% of all contracts awarded by the Department of Defense were
awarded to small business. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 14, 1960, p. 15, col. 6.
In 1953, the top 100 contractors were receiving about 63% of the defense dollar.
See H.R. RnP. No. 1252, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1960). See also Rosebluth, The
Trend in Concentration and its Implications for Small Business, 24 LAw &
CoNTmMp. POB. 192 (1959).
The tendency of the procurement authorities to rely upon a relatively few, large
suppliers has been severely criticized:
The military has exhibited a preference to deal with the few rather than
the many; it has shown reluctance to break down a large order which can be
filled only by a giant concern into a series of smaller orders which will invite
independents to bid. Thus the military, with an eye solely to defense, gives
impact to the trend toward concentration.
HArmToN, THE PoLITIcs oF INumY 21-22 (1957).
4. For a general discussion of this effort, see Hellerstein & Speidel, Government
Assistance and Private Economic Organization for Defense, 9 MIL=rARY L. REv.
99 (1960).
5. A "small business" is one which is independently owned and operated, and
which is not dominant in its field of operation. Business dollar volume and the num-
ber of persons employed both are relevant to this definition. Where the number of
employees is a criterion, the maximum number is varied "from industry to industry
to the extent necessary to reflect different characteristics of such industries and to
take proper account of other relevant factors." 72 Stat. 384, 15 U.S.C. § 632 (1958).
Except for "special industry," the Armed Services Procurement Regulation places
the maximum number at 500, unless the contractor "is certified as a small business
by SBA [the Small Business Administration]." A.S.P.R. § 1-701.1(a)(1), 2 Gov'T
CoNT. REP,. ff 32131 (1960). The SBA's definition of "small business" for purposes of
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table opportunity to compete for defense prime contracts and sub-
contracts.6
A prospective Government contractor, regardless of size, is re-
sponsible for obtaining adequate working capital to finance contract
performance. The traditional sources of this short-term financing
have been internal operations, retained earnings, commercial lending
institutions, and factors.7 These sources, however, are not always
adequate or available, and if the Government were to accept the
bid of an otherwise capable contractor which is unable to obtain
private financing, the Government's contractual position would be
jeopardized. To resolve this dilemma, the Government has devel-
oped a program of financial assistance designed to facilitate full and
timely contract performance.
Because the availability of private financing to small businesses is
uncertain, varying with the condition of the money market and the
credit position of the applicant, Government financial assistance to
the small-business contractor is extremely important. This Article will
examine the effectiveness of Government small-business financing
with respect to the performance of Defense Department fixed-price
supply contracts. In order to sharpen the focus of this examination,
a recent decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals 8
is used as a case study.
Government procurement may be found in 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-8 (Supp. 1960).
For a critical discussion of size standards, see H.R. REP. No. 1252, supra note 3,
at 41-44.
6.
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid,
counsel, assist, and protect in so far as is possible, the interests of small-business
concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair
proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property and services for
the Government . . . be placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that
a fair proportion of the total sales of government property be made to such
enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.
72 Stat. 384, 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1958). Accord, Armed Services Procurement Act, 10
U.S.C. § 2301 (1958). To effectuate this policy and to co-operate with the SBA,
the Department of Defense sets aside certain procurements exclusively for small-
business contractors, A.S.P.R. § 1-706, 2 Cov'T CoNT. EPl. ff 32147 (1960), and
encourages prime contractors to subcontract to small businesses, A.S.P.R. § 7.104.14,
2 Gov'T Corr. are. ff 32701 (1960). During fiscal years 1956 through 1959, small
businesses were awarded 64,505 set-aside contracts valued at 3.446 billion dollars.
H.R. REP. No. 1252, supra note 3, at 32. The SBA also has authority to make a
conclusive certification of the competency of any small business as to business capa-
city and credit, A.S.P.R. § 1-705.6, 2 Cov'T CoNT. EPl. ff 32145 (1960), and to
enter into prime contracts with the United States with the intent to subcontract to
small businesses, 72 Stat. 384, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1958).
7. House Select Comm. on Small Business, Problems of Small-Business Financing,
H.R. REP. No. 1889, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Symposium, Survey of Current
Metiwds of Corporate Financing, 14 Bus. LAw. 883-924 (1959).
8. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals represents the Secretaries of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force in "hearing, considering and determining as fully
and finally as might each of the Secretaries . . . appeals by contractors from de.
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A. The Security Signals Case
In March of 1957, Security Signals Corporation submitted the low
bid on an Army small-business "set-aside" contract for the manufac-
ture of 221,000 urgently needed aluminum windshields for 155-mm
shells. The contract price was approximately $70,000, and install-
ment deliveries were required to be made between June of 1957 and
July of 1958. A pre-award survey 9 revealed that Security Signals
had satisfactorily performed five previous Government contracts,
and that three of those contracts had been financed by the same
bank. Based upon these facts, the contracting officer determined that
Security Signals possessed the physical ability, know-how, and integ-
rity to perform the contract in question. The only remaining con-
sideration was that of financial ability. Security Signals' financial
statement revealed a cash position of about $30,000, an amount
patently inadequate to support performance of the contract. The
crucial question, therefore, was whether the bank which had fin-
anced three previous contracts was again willing to provide the
necessary working capital.
In response to an inquiry from Security Signals, the bank made
the following report to the contracting officer:
We have extended credit to this corporation for several years and they
have shown their ability to meet their obligations in connection with pre-
vious contracts they have had. We are of the opinion that we may he able
to take care of the needs of this corporation in connection with the above
referred to contract although we cannot at this time make a definite com-
mitment as we have not seen the contract. 10
cisions on disputed questions by contracting officers . . . pursuant to the provi-
sions of Armed Services contracts .... A.S.P.R. app. A, pt. 1, § 4, 2 Gov'T CoNT.
REP. If 33741 (1959). Defense Department fixed-price supply contracts contain
the following disputes clause:
Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a ques-
tion of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement
shall be decided by the contracting officer, who shall reduce his decision to
writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The
decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless, within
30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or other-
wise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the
Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative
for the determination of such appeals shall be final and conclusive unless
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or
capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad
faith, or not supported by substantial evidence.
A.S.P.R. § 7-103.12, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. f[ 32675 (1960).
9. A pre-award survey is made to assist the contracting officer to determine the
responsibility of a prospective contractor; it consists of an inspection of plants and
facilities, and of interviews with the contractor's personnel. A.S.P.R. § 1-905.4, 2
Gov'T CoNT. REaP. ff 32173.80 (1960).
10. Security Signals, Inc., Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA)
Dec. No. 4684, 58-2 CCH Board of Contract Appeals Decisions (hereafter cited as
"BCA") 8575, 8580 (1956).
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On the basis of this apparently harmonious relationship with the
bank, Security Signals was determined responsible with regard to
credit and was awarded the contract.
It is significant that while Security Signals had submitted a formal
loan application prior to award, no firm commitment had been ob-
tained from the bank. Further, Security Signals did not request
financial assistance from the Government.
After award of the contract, the bank refused the loan application
on the apparently justified belief that -contrary to the bank's rec-
ommendation-Security Signals was using all available funds for
capital expansion."- At this point, Security Signals had no arrange-
ments for working capital and was unable to obtain financing from
private sources. Pressed for payment by suppliers and hampered by
deteriorating credit, Security Signals was soon 50,000 units in de-
fault. Consequently, Security Signals requested the Government to
cancel the contract. The contracting officer, however, elected to
assist Security Signals in attempting to obtain from Government
sources the financing required to complete performance.
A loan from the Small Business Administration was impractical
because of an estimated six- to eight-week delay in processing the
application. Security Signals' poor financial position 12 deterred the
contracting officer from authorizing progress payments or advance
payments on the contract in question. Finally, it proved impossible
to arrange an acceleration of payments under other Government
contracts being performed by Security Signals. With all possible
avenues of financial assistance foreclosed, Security Signals repudi-
ated the contract. 13
In view of Security Signals' admitted financial inability, the con-
tracting officer advised Security Signals that if action were not taken
within 10 days to assure completion of the contract within a reason-
11. The contractor's evidence indicated that the capital improvements were ab-
solutely necessary, were financed with the personal funds of its president, and were
made in December of 1956. The bank, however, argued that Security Signals had
used all available funds for this expansion, and that its cash position as of June 30,
1957, was very poor. Without resolving this factual conflict, the ASBCA determined
that the failure of Security Signals to obtain a loan was within its control and due
to its own fault or negligence.
12. Security Signals' cash position deteriorated from $31,000 on March 15, 1957,
to less than $500 in August of 1957. The Government had estimated that produc-
tion in accordance with the contract would cost about $10,000 a week.
13. Security Signals' letter to the contracting officer stated in part:
It will be impossible for us to continue producing the Windshield on the
above referenced contract as there is no money available and it will be neces-
sary for us to sell our die casting machines in order to have working capital to
produce on two Chemical Corps contracts. We have been to several other banks
and cannot borrow the money. There is nothing left for us to do but sacrifice
some of our capital equipment in order to continue in business.
Security Signals, Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 4634, 58-2 BCA 8575, 8585 (1958).
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able time, the contract would be terminated for default. When no
response was received within 10 days, the Government effected by
written notice a default termination, repurchased the undelivered
units from another source, and charged the excess costs of re-
purchase to Security Signals' account. Security Signals took timely
appeal to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA),
protesting the default termination and assessment of excess costs.
On appeal, Security Signals argued that the performance failure
and financial inability were due to causes beyond its control and
without its fault or negligence, and that the default termination and
subsequent assessment of excess costs were therefore improper. The
ASBCA found that Security Signals had no definite or reasonable
financing arrangement upon which it could rely when its bid was
submitted, and held that financial inability extant at the time of
bidding does not excuse a failure to perform. The ASBCA further
concluded that the factors which caused the bank to deny the loan
after bid and award were not beyond the control of Security Signals
and not without its fault or negligence. Accordingly, the appeal was
denied.
B. The Problems Raised by Security Signals
The Security Signals case illustrates four stages in the perform-
ance of defense contracts which are of critical importance to small
businesses. The first is the determination of financial responsibility
prior to award. What are the limitations upon the contracting offi-
cer's discretion in obtaining responsible contractors? The second is
the Government's decision to provide financial assistance. What are
the nature and limitations of this assistance, particularly when the
need for financing first arises during actual performance? The third
is the Government's contractual right to terminate a contract for a
default caused by financial inability. At what point may the Govern-
ment terminate the contract and repurchase the supplies from an-
other source? The fourth is the determination of "excusability"
before the ASBCA. Under what circumstances will the Government
contractually assume the risk of a contractor's failure to perform
because of financial inability?
II. nMNWcIAL ABmrrY AND Tim AwAnD OF
GOV rAN_ CONRACTS
To be eligible for the award of Government supply contracts, a
prospective contractor, regardless of size, must be "responsible."14
14. A.S.P.R. § 1-902, 2 GOV'T CoNT. REP. ff 32170.20 (1960); A.S.P.R. § 1-903,
2 Gov'T CoNT. RP,. ff 82171 (1960). This requirement applies to contracts awarded
either by formal advertising, A.S.P.R. § 2-103(iv), 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ff 32188
[Vol. 44:10551060
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This requirement protects the Government and envisions a con-
tractor which, at the time of contract award, possesses both the
business capacity and credit necessary to deliver the supplies re-
quired within the time specified. 11
Determinations of responsibility are made by the contracting offi-
cer.16 Necessarily, he has a great amount of discretion in deciding
whether a particular business concern can satisfy the needs of the
Government. A prospective contractor's experience, its previous per-
formance record, the complexity of the procurement- all will in-
fluence the thoroughness of the contracting officer's investigation. 17
Time limitations between the opening of bids and the date of award
(1960), or by negotiation, A.S.P.R. § 3-102(iv), 2 Gov'T CoNT. Rinp. 7 82279
(1960).
15. A determination of responsibility is solely for the benefit of the Government.
See 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1958) (award by formal advertising to the responsible
bidder whose bid conforms to the invitation and will be the most advantageous to
the United States, price and other factors considered). See also Trand Plastics Co.,
ASBCA Dec. No. 3708, 57-1 BCA 3297 (1957). A contractor must be responsible
at the time of contract award. 39 DEcs. CoMP. GEN. 62 (1959). The minimum
standards of responsibility are established in A.S.P.R. § 1-903, 2 Gov'T CoNr. REP.
7 32171 (1960). The contractor must be a manufacturer of, or a regular dealer in,
the supplies to be furnished. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1958).
In addition, the contractor must have adequate financial resources, the ability to
comply with established delivery schedules, and a satisfactory record of prior per-
formance and business integrity.
When financial responsibility is at issue, the Defense Contract Financing Regula-
tions, A.S.P.R. app. E, §§ 000-528, 2 GoVT CoNr. REP. 7g 35751-35756.33 (1959),
are to be considered in conjunction with the basic responsibility regulations, A.S.P.R.
§ 1-903, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. 7f 32171 (1960). On the assumption that financial
difficulties disrupt production schedules, waste manpower and materials, and may
cause monetary loss to the Government, the Defense Contract Financing Regulations
provide that "contracts should be entered into only with those potential contractors
who . . . have the financial capacity or credit . . . technical skill, management
competence, and plant capacity and facilities . . . reasonably to assure their ability
to perform their contracts in accordance with their terms." A.S.P.R. app. E, § 211,
2 Cov'T CoNT. RFP. 7 35753.55 (1959).
16. A.S.P.R. § 1-904, 2 Gov'T CoNT. RP. 7 32172 (1960). The contracting
officer must make an affirmative, documented determination of responsibility or non-
responsibility. See 33 DEcs. Comm. GEN. 549 (1954); Comp. Gon. Ms. B-140481,
Sept. 8, 1959 (unpublished).
17. See A.S.P.R. § 1-905, 2 Gov'T CoNT. RE. 7 32173 (1960). The contracting
officer is responsible for obtaining adequate information regarding the contractor's
financial condition on as current a basis as is feasible with relation to the date of
contract award. A.S.P.R. § 1-905.2, 2 Cov'T CoNT. REP. 7 32173.10 (1960). Cf.
39 DECS. Comp. Gm. 62 (1959). This information may consist of balance sheets,
profit-and-loss statements, cash forecasts, general financial history, and current or
past production records. Other approved sources of information include Department
of Defense files, credit ratings, financial journals, banks, financial institutions, and
credit agencies. A.S.P.R. § 1-905.3, 2 Gov'T Cony. Ren. 7f 32173.20 (1960). See
also A.S.P.R. app. E, § 213, 2 CoVT CoNT. REP. 7 35753.65 (1959); and A.S.P.R.
app. E, § 214 (1959). In procurements which are significant either in dollar volume
or in the critical nature of the requirement, information regarding workload and
financial capacity must be verified by means of a pre-award survey. A.S.P.R. §
1-905.4(d), 2 CovT CoNT. Re.p. 7 32173.30 (1960).
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may force the contracting officer to consider superficial evidence
which presents an unrealistic financial picture. Even with ample
time the contracting officer's task is often difficult, for a sound finan-
cial evaluation requires thorough knowledge of the prospective con-
tractor's entire business operation. Thus the contracting officer must
ask-and answer-any number of complex questions: To what
extent have other business commitments overloaded capacity and
overextended financial resources and credit? How does estimated
work volume compare with overhead? Are other work orders and
commitments properly scheduled in relation to financial needs?
Does the potential contractor have sufficient experience to submit
realistic cost estimates and to anticipate future cost problems? 18
The task of the contracting officer is further complicated by sub-
contracts.' 9 There is no direct contractual relationship or prikity
between the subcontractor and the Government; 20 the decision to
subcontract and the selection of subcontractors have traditionally
been the business responsibility of the prime contractor. However,
in all prime contracts the Government is interested in whether a
proposed subcontractor has finances adequate to ensure satisfactory
performance. 21 Where negotiated contracts are involved, the Gov-
ernment is particularly interested in the effect of subcontracting on
the prime contract price. Pursuant to these governmental interests,
recent regulation changes have increased the Government's control
over the subcontracting procedures of prime contractors.22 In more
complex procurements of a substantial dollar volume, the subcon-
tractor must be selected after adequate competition 23 and after
18. See A.S.P.R. app. E, § 211, 2 Gov'T CoNrr. REP. f 35753.55 (1959).
19. A subcontract is defined as "any contract . . . other than a prime contract,
entered into by a prime or a subcontractor, calling for supplies or services required
for the performance of any one or more prime contracts." A.S.P.R. § 8-101.23, 2
Gov'T CONT. REX'. ff 32838 (1960). This broad definition includes materialmen and
suppliers as well as parties performing work in accordance with the prime contract
specifications. See 18 DEcs. CoM. GEN. 633 (1939).
20. For an excellent analysis of the problems created by the absence of privity
between the subcontractor and the Government, see Penne, Legal Remedies of Gov-
ernment Subcontractor, 32 So. CaL. L. REv. 1 (1958). See also Symposium, Sub-
contractor Problems, 16 FED. B.J. 171-323 (1956).
21. See A.S.P.R. § 1-906, 2 GOV'T CoNT. RFP. ff 32174 (1960). In advertised
contracts, the invitation for bids may require the prime contractor to perform a
specified percentage of the work without subcontracting, 27 DECS. CorN,. GEN. 81
(1947), to submit to the Government for its evaluation a list of proposed subcon-
tractors, 39 DEcs. Comp. GEN. 247 (1959), or to give to the Government an esti-
mated percentage of intended subcontracting, Keco Industries, ASBCA Dec. No.
5340, 59-2 BCA 10407 (1959).
22. See A.S.P.R. §§ 3-900-04, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. 1111 32458-66 (1960). In
negotiated contracts of a complex nature, the Government reserves the right to
approve the prime contractor's "make or buy" program, its purchasing system, and
its selection of individual contractors. A.S.P.R. § 3-901, 2 Gov'T Corer. RE. ff 32459
(1960).
23. A.S.P.R. § 3-903.3(a)(i), 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ff 32464 (1960); A.S.P.R.
§ 3-903.4(a) (iv), 2 Gov'T Corr. REP. 1 32465 (1960).
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small businesses have been given an equitable opportunity to com-
pete.24 Individual subcontractors must be responsible with regard to
both business capacity and credit.25 One conclusion to be drawn
from the recent regulatory trend is that the Government's increased
control of the subcontracting process has eroded an area of business
judgment previously exercised by the prime contractor. But of more
significance to the present discussion, the Government's control of
subcontracting has introduced another complex element into the
contracting officer's determination of financial responsibility.
In order to satisfy the current regulatory requirement of "credit"
responsibility, the prospective contractor must have, at the time of
award, either adequate financial resources or the ability to obtain
them as required during contract performance. 26 The best evidence
of ability to obtain adequate financing is "a commitment or explicit
arrangement in existence at the time of contract award." 27 Security
Signals, of course, did not at any time have on hand the cash neces-
sary to finance its contract. Evidence of Security Signals' ability to
obtain the requisite working capital consisted of a continuing, har-
monious relationship with a bank which had adequately financed
previous contracts. Yet Security Signals had no firm financial com-
mitment from that bank, a fact of which the contracting officer was
aware. Did the contracting officer abuse his discretion by awarding
the contract to Security Signals without the best evidence of finan-
cial responsibility?
The contracting officer is authorized to determine responsibility
because his day-to-day relations with the contractor place him in the
best position to assess business capacity and credit.28 Consequently,
if a disappointed bidder protests an unfavorable determination, the
contracting officer's decision will not be overturned unless there is
24. A.S.P.R. § 7-104.22, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. g 32705.5 (1960); A.S.P.R. §
1-707.3, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. 7 32156.20 (1960). In prime contracts over one
million dollars, where substantial subcontracting opportunities are available, the
prime contractor is required to establish a program wherein small businesses are
given an equitable opportunity to compete, within their capabilities, for subcontracts.
Previously this program was encouraged but not required. See A.S.P.R. § 1-707
(Sept. 18, 1958). Failure to establish this program may constitute a failure to
perform "any of the other provisions of this contract," justifying a termination for
default. See A.S.P.R. § 8-707(a)(ii), 2 GoVT CoNT. REP. 7 32955 (1960). See
also A.S.P.R. § 3-902(c)(iv), 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. 7f 32460 (1960); A.S.P.R. §
3-903.3(a)(iv), 2 Gov'T CoNT. RE. 7f 32464 (1960). The effect of this control
is to give the Government the right to disapprove rather than the power to select
small-business subcontractors for the prime contractor. The prime contractor cannot
be compelled to award a small-business subcontract which he decides will not con-
tribute to efficient contract performance. See A.S.P.R. § 7-104.14, 2 Covr CoNT.
REP. 7f 32701 (1960).
25. A.S.P.R. § 3-903.4(a)(iii), 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. 7f 32465 (1960).
26. A.S.P.R. § 1-903.1(ii), 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. f[ 82171 (1960).
27. A.S.P.R. § 1-903.3, 2 GoV'T CoNT. REP. 7f 32171.20 (1960).
28. 37 DEcs. Co2,. GEN. 798 (1958); 33 DECS. Coup. GEN. 430 (1957).
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convincing evidence of bad faith, or unless there was no reasonable
basis for the determination.2 9
A determination of responsibility may reasonably be based upon
the contractor's apparent ability to perform the contract; an exami-
nation of all available evidence is not necessarily required.30 On the
assumption that a prospective contractor has no inherent right to a
Government contract, the courts have refused to review a negative
determination unless the claimant alleges fraud, malice, coercion, or
conspiracy on the part of contracting officials.3' In passing, it may be
worthy of note that although a contractor would ordinarily have no
reason to object to a positive determination of its own financial re-
sponsibility, a contract award could conceivably be avoided by a
timely protest to the General Accounting Office if the determination
were grossly erroneous or were made in bad faith.
32
When a small business is determined to be "not responsible" as to
capacity and credit, the contracting officer must refer the case to
the Small Business Administration for review. Under section 8(b)(7)
of the Small Business Act, the Small Business Administration has the
authority both to determine that the prospective contractor is re-
sponsible and to issue a certificate of competency as to capacity and
credit which is binding upon the contracting officer.33 A certificate
29. 37 DECS. Coiw. GEN. 798 (1958); 33 DEcs. CoMT. Gm.r. 430 (1957). Cf.
88 DECS. Com. GEN. 131 (1958) (contracting officer's determination accepted
unless arbitrary or capricious).
30. Comp. Gen. Ms. B-142055, April 12, 1960 (prior unsatisfactory performance
provides apparent substantial basis for determination of nonresponsibility); 37 DECs.
Coap. GFr.. 798 (1958) (determination of nonresponsibility upheld even though
based upon poor prior performance at only one Army post and exercise of greater
diligence would have produced evidence of satisfactory performance elsewhere).
31. Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (allegation of fraud and col-
lusion by officials awarding Government contract states cause of action). Accord,
Heyer Prods. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 904 (Ct. CL 1956). Cf. Highway Pav-
ing Co. v. Hausman, 171 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (state contract). For the
difficulties involved in proving these allegations, see Heyer Prods. v. United States,
177 F. Supp. 251 (Ct. CL 1959) (judgment for defendant on merits).
32. There is no direct authority for this proposition. However, it has been estab-
lished that the contracting officer may not, in good faith, award a contract if there
is a gross error apparent on the face of the bid. Comp. Gen. Ms. B-139435, May 14,
1959 (unpublished); Comp. Gen. Ms. B-141568, Jan. 11, 1960 (unpublished). See
Monroe Mfg. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1956) (contracting
officer on notice of error where average of three low bids is six times higher than
lowest bid). But cf. 89 Dacs. Comp. GEN. 405 (1959) (no notice of error merely
because low bid out of line with current prices in highly competitive industry).
Analogizing these precedents to the problem of financial responsibility, it is arguable
that a contracting officer may not, in good faith, award a contract where his exam-
ination reveals a gross deficiency in financial resources.
33.
It shall also be the duty of the Administration and it is empowered, whenever
it determines such action is necessary . . . to certify to Government procure-
ment officers . . . with respect to the competency, as to capacity and credit, of
any small-business concern or group of such concerns to perform a specific
Government contract. . . . [T]he officers of the Government having procure-
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of competency is conclusive as to all matters of business capacity
and financing, although the contracting officer retains his discretion
in the area of business integrity.3 4
In considering the propriety of the contracting officer's determina-
tion of financial responsibility in Security Signals, two things should
be noted. First, a certificate of competency was not involved, since
Security Signals was found to be responsible. Second, neither
Security Signals nor the competing bidders protested the determina-
tion. Thus there was general agreement as to the existence of an
apparent ability to obtain adequate financing, even though there
was no firm commitment from the bank at the time of contract
award. There being no question as to the contracting officer's good
faith in making the determination, the only real issue is whether he
had a reasonable basis for his decision. 5 Certainly an existing, har-
monious relationship with a bank which had financed several previ-
ous contracts may reasonably be equated to an apparent ability to
obtain financing, even though not constituting the best evidence of
that ability. The proper conclusion is, therefore, that the contracting
officer did not abuse his discretion in awarding the contract to
Security Signals.
ment . . . powers are directed to accept such certification as conclusive, and
are authorized to let such Government contract to such concern or group of
concerns without requiring it to meet any other requirement with respect to
capacity and credit.
72 Stat. 389, 15 U.S.C. § 637(b) (7) (1958). See A.S.P.R. § 1-705.6, 2 Gov'T
CoNT. REP. ff 32145 (1960).
34. See 38 DEcs. CoMP. GEN. 864 (1959) (certificate of competency as to capac-
ity conclusive on all elements relating to over-all ability to perform, including ex-
perience, skill, know-how, and judgment); Comp. Gen. Ms. B-141070, Nov. 24, 1959
certificate of competency as to credit conclusive on financial responsibility). Busi-
ness integrity is not covered by a certificate of competency. 88 DEcs. CoMP. GEN.
864 (1959); A.S.P.R. § 1-705.6(b)(D), 2 GovT CoNT. REP. ff 32145 (1960). See
Comp. Gen. Ms. B-142208, May 20, 1960 (prior unexplained refusal to perform
involves integrity rather than capacity or credit).
The conflict over whether the contracting agency or the SBA should have final
authority to determine the competency of small businesses is accentuated by occa-
sional cases where a certificate of competency is issued over the contracting officer's
determination of nonresponsibility and the contract is later terminated for default.
See Emeco Corp., ASBCA Dec. No. 4101, 59-2 BCA 10366 (1959). Since 1953,
the SBA has issued 672 certificates of competency valued at more than 102.7 million
dollars in awarded contracts. Of these, only 21 small-business contracts have been
terminated for default. See 2 Gov't Contractor ff 284 (July 13, 1960). Whatever
the merits of this controversy, the General Accounting Office has left its final resolu-
tion to Congress. See Comp. Gen. Ms. B-139366, November 6, 1959 (unpublished).
35. The chief price analyst, a member of the contracting officer's team, admitted
that the Government knew that a commitment to provide financing did not exist.
He testified, however, that the letter indicating a harmonious relationship between
Security Signals and the bank was apparently common banking procedure and that
all letters were "pretty well the same." Security Signals, Inc., ASBCA Dec. No.
4634, 58-2 BCA 8575, 8580 (1958). He added, "I would like to say this letter
established the fact that the Security Signal Corporation was in a relationship with
a bank consistent with what had existed in the past." Ibid.
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However, abuse of discretion and realistic contract administration
are two different things. The cold fact is that in the Security Signals
case, the contracting officer permitted an inadequately financed
small business to undertake an important Government contract.36
The results of that unfortunate decision were delay and additional
cost to the Government, and near-bankruptcy to the contractor. The
"apparent ability" to obtain adequate financing afforded little con-
solation to Security Signals when its loan request was refused by the
bank-and even less when the issue of excusability was argued
before the ASBCA. If the participation of small businesses in defense
procurement is to be effectively implemented, no small business
should be awarded a contract until firm, adequate, financial arrange-
ments have been obtained. Only at this level of administrative
responsibility are the interests of both the Government and the
small-business contractor adequately protected.
III. GOVERNMENT FiNANcIAL AsSISTANCE TO
SMALL BusINEsS: ITs PuRPosE AND LIMITATIoNs
The Government administers a program of financial assistance for
the benefit of otherwise-competent contractors which cannot obtain
adequate working capital from private sources. This assistance is
theoretically available either to supplement the contractor's financial
resources at the time of award or to meet a need which first arises
during actual performance of the contract.3 7 However, the program
of Government financial assistance has definite limitations in the
latter situation. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the nature
and limitations of Government financial assistance, with the immedi-
ate purpose of discovering why it was ineffective in the Security
Signals case.
36. The risk of a later performance failure is extremely high when the contract-
ing officer awards a contract to a concern in poor financial condition. See R. P.
Bennett Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 3738, 57-1 BCA 8812 (1957) (inadequate arrange-
ments at time of award); Newark Weaving Mills, ASBCA Dec. No. 3026, 56-2 BCA
2096 (1956) (insufficient credit at time of award); Selectar Indus., ASBCA Dec.
No. 1635, 6 CoNTRAct CAsEs FEDmRL (hereafter cited as "CCF") f1 61769 (1955)
(too many commitments for financial resources); Paint & Pack Corp., ASBCA Dec.
No. 1841 (1953) (inadequate resources, unrealistic pricingat award); Bernal Nar-
row Fabrics, ASBCA Dec. No. 1604 (1953) (limited cash, no credit); Miffinburg
Body Works, ASBCA Dec. No. 723, 5 CCF ff 61276 (1951) (shaky finances at
award).
37. The need for contract financing will not be treated as a handicap in awarding
contracts to qualified contractors which are deemed competent and capable of
satisfactory performance. A.S.P.B. app. E, § 210, 2 Gov'r CONT. REP. I[ 35753.50
(1959). If the need for financing first arises after award, the fact that the contractor
previously disclaimed any need will not disqualify it from proper financing. A.S.P.R.
app. E, § 210.1, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ff 35753.50 (1959).
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A. Assignment of Contract Proceeds
In general, a contractor may not assign claims against the United
States or interests in Government contracts.38 However, an exception
exists where payments in excess of $1,000- due or to become due
under a Government contract - are assigned by the contractor to a
bank, trust company, or other financial institution (including a
federal lending agency) as security for a working-capital loan.39
This exception enables a contractor to obtain financing on the
security of successful contract performance, thereby obviating the
necessity of a mortgage on its capital assets or inventory.
The assignees interest in a Government contract is not ordinarily
subject to setoff by the Government of claims against the assignor,
and this is true whether or not the Government's claims arose out
of the same transaction. 0 If the assignor defaults in performance,
however, the Government's contractual right to any excess costs of
repurchase takes precedence over claims of the assignee.41
38. 65 Stat. 41 (1951), 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958) (claims); 65 Stat. 41 (1951),
41 U.S.C. § 15 (1958) (interests in contracts). For the reasons underlying these
general prohibitions, see Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 576 (1886) (reduces
number of persons with whom Government must deal and permits administrators
to know with whom they are dealing until a final settlement is made). See also
United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1952), and McPhail v. United
States, 181 F. Supp. 251 (Ct. CL 1960).
39. Both 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958) and 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1958), provide that unless
expressly authorized by the contract, an assignment shall not be made to more than
one party and shall not be subject to further assignment, except that any such
assignment may be made to one party as agent or trustee for two or more parties
participating in such financing. For a questionable interpretation of this provision, see
Chelsea Factors v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 685 (Ct. CL 1960). The statutes also
require the assignee to fie a written notice of the assignment with the contracting
otfcer, with bond sureties, and with the contract disbursing officer.
40. Prior to 1951, the Government was authorized to set off claims for the con-
tractor's failure to perform "collateral" promises. See 30 DEcs. Com7,. GEN. 98
(1950) (withholding payroll deductions). Since the 1951 amendment prohibiting
the setoff of independent or dependent claims, the assignee is entitled to the full
amount owed by the Government to the contractor for proper performance. See 37
DEcs. Comp. GEm. 318 (1957). The Government cannot regain possession of monies
paid to the assignee unless fraud can be proved, American Fidelity Co. v. National
City Bank of Evansville, 266 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959), or the payments were im-
properly made under the agreement between the contractor and the Government,
Newark Ins. Co. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 246 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
41. Southside Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1955);
35 DEcs. CoMnP. GEN. 149 (1955); 4 CoPBnu, CoNTRAcrs 895--97 (1951). An as-
signee has no more right to contract proceeds than the assignor had. See Newark
Ins. Co. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 246 (Ct. CL 1960). If the assignor has failed
to perform the contract and is contractually obligated to pay the excess costs of
repurchase, the assignee's claim is subject to this limitation. Cf. United States v.
Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947); Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164
U.S. 227 (1896). If the Government holds contract proceeds owed to a defaulting
contractor as a stakeholder, the Court of Claims has given payment-bond sureties
preference in order of payment over the assignee. National Surety Corp. v. United
States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1955). Contra, American Surety Co. v. Hinds,
260 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1958). But see American Fidelity Co. v. National City
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Financing by means of an assignment of contract proceeds is a
device which is potentially available to all Government contractors.
Its effectiveness, however, depends upon successful contract per-
formance. If the contractor falls behind in deliveries or fails to make
substantial progress, the assignee will receive fewer payments of
contract proceeds from the Government and will correspondingly
reduce its working-capital payments to the contractor. Therefore,
although an assignment of receivables may assist the small-business
contractor in obtaining definite financial commitments at the time
of contract award, it offers little comfort when unexpected difficulties
are encountered during performance of the contract.4
B. Loans Under the Small Business Act
In order to satisfy the short- and intermediate-term borrowing
needs of small business, Congress has established a 575-million-
dollar revolving fund for use by the Small Business Administration
(SBA) in providing loans to small businesses.43 A qualified applicant
may obtain up to $350,000 at no more than 5, per cent interest per
annum, for periods up to 10 years. A primary purpose of this assist-
ance is to provide working capital for both commercial and defense
production. If a small business cannot obtain adequate financing
from private sources at reasonable rates, the SBA may attempt to
stimulate private financing by lending its credit to the small busi-
ness, through either an immediate or deferred participation." If this
approach is not successful, the SBA may then make a direct loan
from appropriated funds.45
Bank of Evansville, 266 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Bank of Arizona v. National
Surety Corp., 237 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1956)' (surety's preference ends when proceeds
leave possession of Government).
42. See Q.V.S., Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 3722, 58-2 BCA 8332 (1958); Valley
Forge Car Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 1924 (1956); Mifflinburg Body Works, ASBCA
Dec. No. 723, 5 CCF ff 61276 (1951) (assignee bank reduced or suspended pay-
ments to contractor in default due to financial difficulties).
43. 72 Stat. 384-87, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-85 (1958). The long-term growth-capital
needs of small business are served by the Small Business Investment Act of 1958,
72 Stat. 689-97, 15 U.S.C. §§ 661-96 (1958). See Hellerstein & Speidel, supra note
4, at 108.
44. The SBA's policy is to attempt to induce the lending institution to make the
loan on the understanding that the SBA will participate at a later time, if necessary.
This policy is dictated by law: "No immediate participation may be purchased unless
it is shown that a deferred participation is not available; and no loan may be made
unless it is shown that a participation is not available." 72 Stat. 387, 15 U.S.C. §
636(a)(2) (1958).
45.
The total number of loans approved under the SBA small business loan pro-
gram in the period between the inception of the act through June 30, 1959
, , .is 14,609 representing $690,053,372. The SBAs share of these loans is
$582,888,654. Of these loans approved, a total amount of $582,394,919 has
been disbursed on 12,914 loans. The SBA's share of the funds disbursed was
$490,583,060 [the remainder being supplied by participating institutions]. There
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Both prime contractors and subcontractors may apply for direct
loans under the Small Business Act.46 Because these loans are admin-
istered by an agency other than the contracting agency, difficulties
encountered by a contractor in performing a particular defense con-
tract do not affect the availability of a direct loan from the SBA.
However, a routine two- to six-month delay in the SBA's processing
of loan applications, coupled with a rejection rate of approximately
45 per cent, make this form of financial assistance more effective if
obtained prior to award of the contract rather than during its
performance.47
C. The Defense Contract Financing Regulations
The Defense Contract Financing Regulations 48 are applicable to
all types of defense contracts for work, supplies, and services. 9 These
regulations authorize guaranteed loans, progress payments, and ad-
vance payments necessary to finance both performance and termina-
tion of the contract; partial payments made upon delivery of a
portion of the units called for under the contract are not considered
to be "financing," within the meaning of the regulations.50
The Government prefers that the contractor obtain private financ-
ing, provided that such financing is available at reasonable rates.
If private financing is not feasible, however, direct financial assist-
ance will be considered by the Government in the following order of
preference: customary progress payments, guaranteed loans, unusual
progress payments, and advance payments.51 It is important to
realize that the primary purpose of these methods of financial
assistance is to facilitate timely contract performance. Consequently,
the contractor's need for financing is carefully weighed against the
probability of successful performance within the time specified by
the contract. The availability of appropriated funds is, of course, a
limiting factor in every case.
has been a steady increase in both the number of loans approved and the total
amount of funds disbursed in each fiscal year since the lending program began,
the largest increase being in fiscal year 1959, immediately subsequent to the
time the SBA was made a permanent agency.
H.R. REm. No. 1252, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1960).
46. 72 Stat. 887, 15 U.S.C. § 636(a) (1958). The statute does not distinguish
between prime contractors and subcontractors, but simply authorizes direct loans to
"small business concerns" in need of working capital for defense production.
47. The SBA often takes from two to six months to process loan applications.
Approximately 40-45% of all applications are ultimately rejected. See H.R. REP. No.
1252, note 45 supra, at 38-39, 45.
48. The new Defense Contract Financing Regulations were issued on May 25,
1959, and supersede the joint finance regulations of December 17, 1956, issued as
AR 715-6, NAVEXOS P-1006 (NPD 31-001) and AFR 173-133. The new regula-
tions are contained in Appendix E of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation.
49. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 000, 2 GOV'T CoNT. REi. ff 85751 (1959).
50. Ibid.
51. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 209, 2 Gov'T CoNT. R '. f 35753.45 (1959).
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(1) Guaranteed loans
If a commercial lending institution is unwilling to furnish work-
ing capital on the security of a contractor's credit or assignment of
receivables, the Government may be willing (for a fee) to guarantee
the loan under section 301(a) of the Defense Production Act of
1950.52 A commercial bank which requires a guarantee must apply
through the local federal reserve bank to the interested guaranteeing
agency.58 If the loan is for the purpose of providing working capital
for a contractor holding an essential defense contract - and no other
source of financing is available -the guaranteeing agency is author-
ized to issue a certificate of eligibility.54 Upon receipt of such a
certificate, the federal reserve bank executes a guarantee contract
with the lending bank, the latter disbursing funds to the contractor
and administering the loan.
Both the maximum amount of guaranteed credit and the maturity
date of the loan are set in reasonable conformance with the con-
tractor's requirements for the defense contract (or contracts) being
performed. Under the guarantee contract, the guaranteeing agency
is obligated-upon demand of the lending bank-to purchase a
stated percentage of the loan and to share losses in the amount of the
guaranteed percentage, which is normally 90 per cent of the bor-
rower's investment in defense production contracts. 55 The amount
of this investment is determined by an asset formula embracing all
items for which the borrower would be entitled to payment upon
performance or termination of its contracts.56 In exceptional cases in
52. 67 Stat. 129 (1953), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2091 (1958). See Exec. Order No.
10480, 18 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1953). Implementing regulations are contained in
A.S.P.R. app. E, § 101, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. fr 35752.10 (1959); A.S.P.R. app. E,
§ 102, 2 Gov'T CONT. REP. ir 35752.20 (1959); and A.S.P.R. app. E, §§ 300-15,
2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ut 35754-35754.75 (1959). The termination date of the De-
fense Production Act has been extended to June 30, 1962. Pub. L. No. 86-560, 74
Stat. 282 (1960).
53. Authorized guaranteeing agencies are the departments of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior, as well as the General Services
Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 306, 2
Gov'r CoNT. REP. ff 35754.30 (1959). The National Air and Space Agency has
recently been added to this list. Exec. Order No. 10819, 24 Fed. Reg. 3779 (1959).
If more than one agency is interested in financing a group of prime contracts or
subcontracts involving several agencies, the agency with the preponderance of in-
terest- on the basis of dollar amount of the prospective borrower's unfilled and
unpaid balance - is the responsible agency.
54. Although guaranteed loans are made only for working-capital purposes,
A.S.P.R. app. E, § 208, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ff 35753.40 (1959), the Defense Produc-
tion Act also gives the President authority to provide for loans for expansion of a
contractor's productive capacity. 66 Stat. 298 (1952), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2092 (1958).
Guaranteed loans must serve the "national defense," a term which applies to "pro-
grams for military and atomic energy production or construction, military assistance
to any foreign nation, stockpiling, and directly related activity." A.S.P.R. app. E, §
101, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ff 35752.10 (1959).
55. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 308, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. g 35754.40 (1959).
56. The asset formula does not include amounts to become due upon future per-
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which the operations of a particular contractor are essential to the
national defense, the guaranteed percentage may be increased to
100 per cent of the borrowers investment in defense contracts.57
The guaranteeing agency is secured by an assignment of receivables
from the contractor and, where necessary, by a mortgage of fixed
assets.58
Special privileges are accorded to small businesses under the
guaranteed loan program. Small businesses desirous of guaranteed
loans, whether applying as prime contractors or subcontractors, need
not show the unavailability of private financing if they are other-
wise qualified.59 Small-business subcontractors may deal directly
with the lending bank rather than through the prime contractor,
although a loan is not available until the subcontract has been
awarded. 0
(2) Progress payments based on costs
No separate consideration is required for the inclusion of a
progress-payment clause in a fixed-price supply contract.(' If no pro-
vision for progress payments was made in the original contract,
however, the contractor must give adequate, new consideration in
order to obtain progress payments from the Government.62 Progress
payments are made to the contractor as the work progresses, and
generally are based either on costs incurred or on a specified per-
centage or stage of completion.63 However, the Defense Contract
formance, cash collateral, or bank deposits. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 308, 2 Gov'T CoNT.
EP. fr 35754.40 (1959). This formula may be relaxed for limited periods when
the contractor's credit or working capital is inadequate to continue performance.
See Cary, Government Financing of Essential Contractors: The Reorganization of
the Glenn L. Martin Company, 66 HAnv. L. REv. 834 (1953).
57. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 307, 2 Gov'T CoNT. RE'. 11 35754.35 (1959). Full, 100%
guarantees are limited to the greatest extent compatible with the requirements of
national defense, and will be approved only where the guaranteeing agency deter-
mines that (1) the circumstances are exceptional, (2) the contractor's operations are
vital to the national defense, and (3) no other suitable means of financing are
available. Ibid.
58. A.S.P.R. app. E, §§ 310-11, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. fff 85754.50-.55 (1959).
59. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 314, 2 Gov'T CoNT. RE'. II 35754.70 (1959).
60. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 303, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REv. II 35754.15 (1959).
61. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 526 (1959). It is assumed that the contract price will
reflect the benefit of a progress-payment provision.
62. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 528 (1959). See United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg.,
225 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1955) (one per cent reduction in contract price is adequate
consideration).
63. Advances of public money are prohibited unless authorized by a specific
appropriation or other law. 31 U.S.C. § 529 (1958).The Armed Services Procure-
ment Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2307 (1958), authorizes the head of any agency to make
"advance, partial, progress, or other payments under contracts for property or serv-
ices made by the agency" provided that such payments do not exceed the unpaid
contract price, are adequately secured, and are in the public interest. Regulations
implementing the progress-payment authority are A.S.P.R. app. E, § 105, 2 Cov'T
CoNrr. REP. gi 35752.50 (1959); A.S.P.R. app. E, § 106, 2 Cov'T CoNT. REP. ff
35752.60 (1959); and A.S.P.R. app. E, §§ 500-28, 2 Gov'T CONT. REP. lilt 35756--
Financing Regulations apply only to progress payments which are
based upon costs.
The regulations provide for two types of cost-based progress pay-
ments: "customary" payments and "unusual" payments. The Govern-
ment makes "customary" progress payments as a matter of course
if (1) the contract calls for delivery six months or more after con-
tract award, and (2) the contractor's working capital will be
materially impaired by high predelivery expenses. 4 Ordinarily,
"customary" progress payments may not exceed 70 per cent of total
costs incurred or 85 per cent of direct labor and material costs.65
If "customary" progress payments prove inadequate, the contractor
may obtain payments in excess of the foregoing percentages-
"unusual" progress payments-by demonstrating to the head of
the procuring agency an "actual need therefor, with due regard to
the [Government's] preference for private financing, including
guaranteed loans." 66 The exact percentage of costs allowed in a
particular application for "unusual" progress,, payments will be
limited by actual need. Whether "customary or unusual pay-
ments are involved, the aggregate amount of the progress payments
made may never exceed 70 per cent of the total contract price.68
Although progress payments are essentially the equivalent of self-
liquidating loans (to be repaid through delivery of the units specified
in the contract), no interest is charged on them. The Government
recoups any progress payments made to a given contractor by de-
ducting a corresponding amount from the contract price of delivered
units. This liquidation scheme does not require that the Government
recover the entire amount disbursed as progress payments before
more money may be paid to the contractor; rather, the Government
recovers its progress-payment disbursements piecemeal, by deduct-
ing from the contract price due at delivery of each unit a given pro-
portion of that price. In fact, the Government's deduction for unliqui-
dated progress payments cannot exceed a certain percentage of the
gross amount invoiced-70 per cent, in the case of progress pay-
ments computed in terms of total cost incurred. 9 As security for
35756.63 (1959). For progress-payment clauses, see A.S.P.R. app. E, § 510, 2
Gov'T CoNT. REP. f[ 35756.80 (1959). See also Whelan, Government Supply Con-
tracts: Progress Payments Based on Costs: The New Defense Regulations, 26 Foan-
HAm L. REv. 224 (1957).
64. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 503, 2 Gov'T CoNr. REP. 3[ 5756.09 (1959).
65. Ibid.
66. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 505, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. 3t 5756.15 (1959).
67. Ibid.
68. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 510.1(a)(4), 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. W[ 35756.30 (1959).
This figure applies only to progress payments based on a percentage of total costs.
For the maximum percentage of contract price permitted in the case of progress
payments based on direct labor and materials costs, see A.S.P.R. app. E, § 510.2(b),
2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. W 35756.30 (1959).
69. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 510.1(b), 2 GOV'T CoNT. REP. ff 35756.30 (1959). The
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unliquidated payments, the Government takes "title" to all materials.
inventory, work in progress, tools, and data which are acquired by
the contractor for performance of the contract in question."°
The Defense Contract Financing Regulations confer definite bene-
fits upon small-business prime contractors which indicate a need
for progress payments at the time of bidding or prior to award. If
it appears that small businesses will bid for a contract, the contract-
ing officer may provide for progress payments in his invitation for
bids, even though the contract is one for which progress payments
would normally be unavailable.71 Further, if it is determined that
only small-business bidders will need progress payments, the con-
tracting officer has authority under the Armed Services Procurement
Act 72 to restrict progress payments to those bidders alone.73 Finally,
a small-business prime contractor is entitled to progress payments
computed at 75 per cent rather than 70 per cent of total costs
incurred, or at 90 per cent rather than 85 per cent of direct labor
and material costs.74
The plight of the small-business subcontractor has also been
ameliorated by the Defense Contract Financing Regulations. The
regulations now require prime contractors which are receiving prog-
ress payments to apply for and distribute progress payments to
small-business subcontractors; 71 prime contractors still have an op-
tion with regard to other subcontractors, however. Unlike the pro-
cedure for guaranteed loans,76 a subcontractor must channel its
contracting officer may liquidate payments at a higher percentage under certain
exceptional circumstances, however. See A.S.P.R. app. E, § 510.1(c), 2 GovT CONT.
Bxn,. 7 35756.30 (1959).
70. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 510.1(d), 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. f 35756.80 (1959);
A.S.P.R. app. E, § 525 (1959). "Tile" in this context is primarily a security de-
vice to protect the Government's interest in the event of competing liens or of the
contractor's bankruptcy. See In re American Boiler Works, 220 F.2d 319 (8d Cir.
1955). Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialmen have
property rights in inventory and in work-in-progress to extent not required to satisfy
Governments paramount lien). Although the contractor has effective control of
progress7payment property and bears the risk of loss, the Government's latent inter-
est is suilicient to support an assertion of federal immunity from state and local taxa-
tion. See Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958) (tax validated
on other grounds). For a critical analysis of the "title" theory, see Whelan, Govern-
ment Contract Privileges: A Fertile Ground for State Taxation, 44 VA. L. REv. 1099,
1107 (1958).
71. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 504, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. 7 85756.12 (1959). Provision
for progress payments is made in invitations for bids, if bids are likely from one
or more small businesses and it is estimated that the procurement will involve
$100,000 or more. However, if the supplies are quick-turn-over items for which
predelivery financing is not customary in the industry, progress payments are
discouraged.
72. As amended and codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2307(a)(2) (1958).
73. See A.S.P.R. app. E, § 504.3, 2 Gov'T CoNT. BRn'. ff 35756.12 (1959).
74. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 504.2, 2 CovT CoNT. BE'. 7f 35756.12 (1959).
75. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 510.1(j), 2 GoVT Corr. BRF. 7 35756.80 (1959); A.S.P.R.
app. E, § 513, 2 CovT CoNT. BaE'. 7f 35756.39 (1959).
76. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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application for progress payments through the prime contractor.
This is accomplished simply by inserting a provision for progress
payments in the subcontract.
(3) Advance payments
Advance payments are made by the Government to a contractor
to enable it to complete contract performance.77 Advance payments
may be made in conjunction with progress payments, but because
advance payments are made without regard to work progress or
costs incurred, the Government is more reluctant to authorize
advance payments. Accordingly, in order to obtain advance pay-
ments, the typical contractor must show an actual need for financing
which cannot be satisfied either from commercial sources or from
other governmental sources.78
When advance payments are received, the contractor must deposit
them in a special bank account, and withdrawals are closely super-
vised by the Government to ensure that their use is restricted to
actual need. The Government's interest is further protected by a lien
on the supplies contracted for, on the credit balance in the special
account, and on property acquired for performance of the contract.
79
In addition, an advance-payment bond may be required."
As with progress payments, advance payments are liquidated by
application against the contract price of delivered units or the cost
of completed work. Unlike the treatment of progress payments,
however, interest is charged on unliquidated advance payments at
the rate of five per cent per annum.81
Advance payments are designed to facilitate contract performance
in difficult situations. One type of situation in which advance pay-
ments may be appropriate is where the contractor must perform a
Government contract which is not fixed in price. Thus if the con-
tractor must perform research and development, manage Govern-
ment facilities, or acquire facilities under a cost-reimburseable
contract, private financing is difficult to obtain and progress pay-
ments may be unavailable. Another such situation is posed by the
essential contractor that has become financially overextended.
Finally, there is the exceptional situation in which advance pay-
ments are more beneficial to the Government than any other method
77. The statutory authority for advance payments is 10 U.S.C. § 2307 (1958).
See note 63 supra. Regulations implementing this authority are A.S.P.R. app. E,
§ 103, 2 Gov'T CoNT. Rs,. f[ 35752.30 (1959); A.S.P.R. app. E, § 104, 2 Gov'T
CONT. REP. ff 35752.40 (1959); and A.S.P.R. app. E, §§ 400-18, 2 Gov'T CoNT.
RFP. f[f 35755--35755.90 (1959).
78. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 404, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. f[ 35755.20( 1959). These stand-
ards are relaxed for certain classifications of contractors. See ibid.
79. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 413, 2 Gov'T CoNT. RF.,. f[ 35755.65 (1959).
80. Ibid.
81. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 403, 2 Gov'T CorN. REP. f[ 35755.15 (1959). Interest-
free advance payments are available in certain types of contracts. See ibid.
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of financing. The Government's authority to make advance pay-
ments in these and similar situations is spelled out in some detail in
the Defense Contract Financing Regulations.82
As pointed out previously, the primary purpose of advance pay-
ments is to enable the contractor to complete performance of its
contract. Because successful performance may depend in part upon
the actions of subcontractors, the Government has authority to make
advance payments to prime contractors for advances to subcon-
tractors.8 3 However, prime contractors must meet such exacting
standards to obtain reimbursement for advances under the regula-
tions that they are often reluctant to adopt this method of financing
subcontractors.
D. The Limitations of Government Financial Assistance
In considering the limitations of Government financial assistance
to small businesses, two important distinctions must be made. The
first involves a difference in purpose between the assistance adminis-
tered by the SBA and that provided by the military departments.
The second relates to whether the contractor's financial need arises
before or after contract award.
The primary purpose of the military departments in administering
defense-contract financing is to obtain the timely delivery of good-
quality supplies at the least possible cost to the Government.
Small-business financial assistance which does not secure such per-
formance is imprudent and may be beyond the scope of Defense
Department financing. However, refusal of financial assistance by
the Defense Department need not foreclose SBA assistance. The
SBA administers a long-range program of economic assistance to
small business in order to stimulate and expand the economy. Given
the present emphasis on production for the national defense, it is
proper that the SBA strive to provide maximum financial assistance
to qualified concerns in the performance of defense contracts.
The second distinction turns upon whether the contractor's need
for Government financing is indicated prior to award, or becomes
apparent only during actual performance. Security Signals was
50,000 units in default and had practically no working capital when
its need for Government financing was first revealed to the contract-
ing officer. Unfortunately, none of the three forms of assistance
provided by the Defense Contract Financing Regulations could be
made available at that stage of performance.
If application had been made for a guaranteed loan, Security
Signals might have qualified as an essential defense contractor
under the Defense Production Act."4 However, this avenue would
82. See A.S.P.R. app. E, § 408 (1959).
83. A.S.P.R. app. E, § 400.1, 2 Gov'T CoNT. RE:a. it 35755 (1959).
84. See notes 54, 56 and 57 supra.
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not be open to the many small-business contractors capable of sup-
plying only standard, "off the shelf" items. Further, the time involved
in processing a guaranteed loan application makes it impossible for
an applicant to obtain immediate assistance.85 And even with a
guarantee, it is unlikely that any private bank would be willing to
advance funds to a small business already in default.
Under the facts of the Security Signals case, progress payments
were also unavailable. The contract provided that the time between
date of award and first delivery was to be only three months.
Further there had been no indication that unusually high pre-
delivery expenses would be incurred- despite the fact that by the
time Government financing had become imperative, Security Signals'
working capital and credit had deteriorated to a point where
progress payments were deemed imprudent. 6 Advance payments
were denied for similar reasons.8 7
In summary, except for extraordinary relief for essential defense
contractors,8 the purpose of defense-contract financing often pre-
cludes effective assistance to businesses in financial distress, for
the risk of monetary loss frequently exceeds the reasonable expecta-
tion of timely performance. The limitations upon defense-contract
financing for small businesses become most apparent where the
need for financing first develops during performance, rather than
where pre-award arrangements for Government financing later
85. The average time required to process a guaranteed loan is 30 days. Processing
of the loan application requires that it go through the private bank, the federal
reserve bank, the guaranteeing agency, and then back again to the private bank.
See Bachman, Defense Department Contract Financing, 25 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
228, 285 (1957).
86. If progress pa ents are arranged at the time of award, the contracting officer
has authority to reduce or suspend the payments if contract performance is sub-
sequently endangered by the contractor's poor financial condition and if the risk of
monetary loss is high. See A.S.P.R. app. E, § 510.1(c), 2 Gov'r CoNT. RE'. f
35756.30 (1959); A.S.P.R. app. E, § 524.2 (1959). To avoid this action, the con-
tractor must show that the supplies will be delivered on time and that complete
liquidation of progress payments will occur, since the Government's assurance of
repayment depends upon satisfactory performance. But cf. United States v. Lennox
Metal Mfg., 225 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1955) (contracting officer's administration of
progress payments cannot be arbitrary, capricious, or unfair).
87. See A.S.P.R. app. E, § 414.2(11)(b) (1959).
88.
The President may authorize any department or agency of the Government
which exercises functions in connection with the national defense, acting in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the President for the protection of
the Government, to enter into contracts or into amendments or modifications of
contracts .. . and to make advance payments thereon, without regard to other
provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modifica-
tion of contracts, whenever he deems that such action would facilitate national
defense.
72 Stat. 972, 50 U.S.C. § 1431 (1958). See Exec. Order No. 10789, 23 Fed. Reg.
8897 (1958); A.S.P.R. §§ 17-000-17-502, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. fff1 38801-73 (1960).
See also McClelland, The Administration of Title II of the First War Powers Act,
61 DIcK. L. rv. 215 (1957); Cary, supra note 56.
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prove insufficient. It is much easier to increase the guaranteed per-
centage of a loan or to make unusual progress payments to a
contractor which has been supervised since the date of award than
it is to arrange new financial commitments as difficulties arise.
Therefore, it would seem that in situations in which the military
departments are unable prudently to provide financial assistance,
the Government's residual obligation to small business ought to be
assumed by the SBA. If this agency is unable to act promptly, a seri-
ous gap exists in the Government's over-all program of financial
assistance to small businesses. Yet in the Securitiy Signals case the
method of assistance especially designed for small businesses - a
loan under the Small Business Act-was ineffective because of the
length of time required by the SBA to process the loan application.8 9
In view of the Security Signals case, it is permissible to conclude
that prospective contractors which obtain Government financial
assistance prior to award may be in a better position than those
which first request Government financing during performance -an
incongruous result, since the Government would prefer that con-
tractors obtain financing from private sources. A second conclusion
to be drawn from Security Signals is that the SBA may be-or at
any rate ought to be-more willing to finance a particular small-
business contractor than are the military departments. Of course
the SBA was not created for the express purpose of "bailing out"
concerns in poor financial condition, but if a small-business defense
contractor's sole obstacle to performance is the lack of working
capital, the broader objectives of the SBA support a favorable con-
sideration of the contractor's application. 0 Yet the fact remains that
in the Security Signals case, at least, a decision on the availability of
financial assistance could not be obtained from the SBA in time to
avert a default termination of the contract in question.
The obvious remedy for a contractor faced with this problem is to
obtain a small-business participation or direct loan from the SBA
prior to the contract award. However, if the contractor has a line of
commercial credit"' or other assurance of private financing, the
89. See H. R. REP. No. 1252, supra note 45, at 45.
90. An SBA loan must be of "such sound value or so secured as reasonably to
assure repayment." 72 Stat. 694, 15 U.S.C. § 636(a) (1958). SBA statistics reveal
that the three primary reasons for rejecting loan applications are: (1) lack of
reasonable assurance of ability to repay the loan and other obligations from earnings,(2) an unsatisfactory proportion of debts to net worth before and after the loan, and(3) collateral (along with other credit factors) not deemed sufficient to protect the
Government's interest. See H. R. REP. No. 1252, supra note 45, at 89. Only 5.3%
of the total rejections from 1953 until June 30, 1959, were because the applicant
would have had inadequate working capital after the loan. Since Security Signals'
primary impediment was the lack of working capital, and since Security Signals was
performing other Government contracts without difficulty, the reasons for rejecting
a loan application were minimal in the Security Signals case.
91. Commercial lines of credit are established "to support the cash cycle dictated
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SBA's services are not available. This difficulty could be alleviated
if prospective defense contractors were permitted to establish credit
with the SBA prior to award, even though no actual need existed at
that time. With much of the time-consuming processing accom-
plished, there would be a minimum of administrative delay if the
applicant subsequently developed a need for SBA assistance.
Realistically, the Government cannot effectuate its policy of bol-
stering small-business participation in defense procurement merely
by ensuring that a fair proportion of defense contracts is allocated
to small business. Considering the complexity and the unique risks
of defense procurement, as well as the serious economic conse-
quences of a termination for default, financial assistance should be
made readily available to the small-business contractor from the
date of bidding for the contract to the time of final payment. As
illustrated by the plight of Security Signals, this assistance is often
unavailable at the time of greatest need.
IV. FiNANcAL INABILrrY AND T=E GoVNMEN'S
CoNTEAcTUAL RIGHT To TERMINATE FoR DEFAULT
The Government's program of financial assistance to defense con-
tractors is designed to minimize the risk of performance failures.
However, when all sources of financial assistance have been ex-
hausted and the contractor is still unable to perform, the military
departments are authorized to terminate the contract for default
and repurchase the necessary supplies from another source. 2 The
economic consequences of such action can be quite severe, particu-
larly where a small-business contractor is involved. Consequently, it
is important to examine rather closely the Government's contractual
right to terminate for a default caused by financial inability.
All Defense Department fixed-price supply contracts -regardless
of the method of award or the complexity of the procurement-
must contain a standard default clause. 3 The contractual right of
by production schedules . . . arising under defense contracts." Chermak, Contrac-
tor Financing, 18 FED. B.J. 286, 294 (1958). The lending bank is normally secured
by an assignment of contract proceeds.92. For a general discussion of default terminations, see Coons & Whelan, Default
Termination of Defense Department Fixed Price Supply Contracts, 32 NoTRE DAMM
LAw. 189 (1957); Risik, Defaults in Federal Government Contracts, 14 FEI. B.J.
339 (1954).
93. A.S.P.R. § 8-707, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ff 32955 (1960). Because reference is
made to specific provisions of the default clause throughout the remainder of this
Article, the default clause is set out in its entirety in the Appendix to this Article.
Consequently, statements based upon the language of the default clause are not
documented in footnote form.
Other types of contracts require different default clauses. See A.S.P.R. § 8-709,
2 GOV'T CONT. REP. f[ 32957 (1959) (fixed-price construction contract); A.S.P.R. §
8-710, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ff 32958 (1959) (fixed-price research and development
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the Government to terminate for default is defined in paragraph (a)
of the default clause. Subparagraph (a) (i) provides that the Gov-
ernment may terminate the contract by written notice to the con-
tractor "if the contractor fails to make delivery of the supplies . . .
within the time specified [in the contract] . . . or any extension
thereof. . . ." Subparagraph (a) (ii) provides termination authority
"if the contractor fails to perform any of the other provisions of [the]
. . . contract, or so fails to make progress as to endanger perform-
ance of [the] . . . contract in accordance with its terms. . . ." Ter-
minations in accordance with subparagraph (a) (ii) are proper only
if the contractor fails to cure the alleged defects in performance
ithin 10 days after receiving written notice of them from the con-
tracting officer.
Both varieties of default may be "excused" under paragraph (c)
of the default clause. However, the Government's basic right to
terminate is not affected by this provision. Paragraph (c) merely
provides that an "excused" contractor will not be charged for excess
costs of repurchase- in which case the termination will be charac-
terized as "for the convenience of the Government." 94
Paragraph (f) of the default ,clause states that the "rights and
remedies of the Government provided in this clause shall not be
exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies pro-
vided by law or under this contract." This provision not only pre-
serves the Government's common-law right to terminate for breach
of contract and seek damages, but also ensures that reliance by the
Government upon paragraph (f) will not constitute action pursuant
to the default clause.
The distinction between common-law termination and termina-
tion under the default clause is vital. If the Government terminates
the contract for default under paragraph (a) -and the failure of
performance is found to be not excusable- the Government has a
contractual right to charge the excess costs of repurchase to the
contractor's account. 5 Such costs are measured by the difference
contract); A.S.P.R. § 8-708, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. fr 32956 (1960) (cost-reimburse-
ment supply contract).
94. See Hofmann Indus., ASBCA Dec. No. 2367 (1955). Although paragraph
(a) of the default clause states that "the Government may, subject to the provisions
of paragraph (c) . . . terminate," paragraph (c) provides only that the contractor
"shall not be liable for any excess costs if the failure to perform the contract" is
excusable. If the cause of default is excusable, paragraph (e) directs that the
termination shall be deemed to have been issued as a "Termination for Convenience
of the Government." See A.S.P.R. § 8-701, 2 Gov'T CoNT. REP. ir 82948 (1959)
(contractor entitled to costs and reasonable profit on work done). The contractor may
attack the propriety of a paragraph (a) termination and argue the issue of excus-
ability in a timely appeal to the ASBCA from the written notice of termination.
Virginia Dare Extract Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 4916, 59-1 BCA 9560 (1959); Fulford
Mfg., ASBCA Dec. Nos. 2143, 2144, 6 CCF g[ 61815 (1955). See note 8 supra.
95. Paragraph (b) of the default clause provides that "the Government may
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between contract price and repurchase price rather than by the rule
applied to ordinary contractual damages under local law-nor-
mally, the difference betweeen contract price and fair market value
at the time of default. 6 Further, excess costs may be collected
through administrative proceedings rather than by obtaining a judg-
ment in a court of competent jurisdiction. However, the entire
process of termination and repurchase is subject to review by the
ASBCA. 7
If the Government bases its termination upon the common-law
rights reserved by paragraph (f) rather than upon the termination
rights created by paragraph (a), there is no contractual right to
charge the excess costs of repurchase to the contractor's account.
In this circumstance, the Government must maintain an action for
damages, the measure of which will be determined by local law.
Another result of the Government's decision to terminate under its
common-law rights reserved by paragraph (f) is that the ASBCA
will have no jurisdiction to review the propriety of the termination91
With this background, let us reconsider the Security Signals case.
Security Signals was 50,000 units behind schedule when its financial
difficulties were first revealed to the Government. At this point, the
Government could have terminated the contract under subpara-
graph (a) (i) of the default clause. Instead, the contracting officer
elected to permit Security Signals to continue performance while
procure, upon such terms and in such manner as the Contracting Officer may deem
appropriate, supplies or services similar to those so terminated, and the contractor
shall be liable to the Government for any excess costs for such similar supplies or
services."
96. Eastern Tool & Mfg., ASBCA Dec. No. 4815, 58-2 BCA 7933 (1958). Since
the Government often procures military supplies with no commercial counterparts, it
may be difficult to calculate fair market value at the time of default. Paragraph (b),
therefore, provides realistic flexibility in determining damages. See Van Cleve,
"Similarity" and the Assessment of Excess Costs Under the Government Default
Clause, 8 Mu-rrIY L. REv. 147 (1960). The special rule of damages is not avail-
able if paragraph (b) is omitted from the contract, Iso Prods., ASBCA Dec. No.
879 (1953), or if paragraph (f) is used in lieu of paragraph (b), 34 DEcs. Comp.
GEx. 347 (1955).
97. Virginia Dare Extract Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 4916, 59-1 BCA 9560 (1959);
Office Equipment Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 5040, 59-2 BCA 10,393 (1959). See note
94 supra.
98. The ASBCA is without authority to grant relief not expressly or impliedly
sanctioned by the contract. Harry Lyons, Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 5485, 60-1 BCA
12512 (1960); Metropolitan Metals, ASBCA Dec. No. 5741, 59-2 BCA 10933
(1959). See Birnbaum, Questions of Law and Fact and the Jurisdiction of the ASBCA,
19 FED. B.J. 120 (1959). On this theory, the ASBCA has dismissed contractors'
appeals from the Government's exercise of common-law rights rather than rights
derived from the default clause. See Industrial Precision Prods., ASBCA Dec. No.
3171 (1956); Midwest Waste Material Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 2868 (1956) (can-
celled contract at no cost to contractor rather than terminating under paragraph
(a)); Joseph Lerner & Sons, ASBCA Dec. No. 2156 (1955); Scherr Bros., ASBCA
Dec. No. 2888 (1955) (retained payments due contractor to satisfy common-law
damages rather than repurchasing under paragraph (b)).
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efforts were being made to obtain financial assistance, but failed to
set a new delivery schedule. The contracting officer's action-in
legal effect -nullified the previous failure to deliver on time and,
in the absence of a new delivery schedule, gave Security Signals a
reasonable time in which to perform 9
By his own action, therefore, the contracting officer in Security
Signals was placed in the difficult position of determining precisely
when the Government's contractual right to terminate for default
could again be exercised. Subparagraph (a) (i) was of no avail until
Security Signals failed to perform under a new delivery schedule,
and no such schedule had been established. 110 Subparagraph (a) (ii)
was equally ineffective because neither circumstance covered by
subparagraph (a) (ii) existed at that time: There was no contract
clause which required a certain level of financial resources to be
maintained, so the lack of adequate working capital was not in itself
a failure "to perform any of the other provisions" of the contract.' 0'
Further, the fact that Security Signals was in poor financial con-
dition did not necessarily "endanger performance" of the contract,
so long as there was a reasonable possibility that assistance would
soon be forthcoming.10 2
In short, the Government's contractual right to terminate for de-
fault may become elusive if the contracting officer decides to assist
a defaulting contractor that is financially overextended to the point
that it cannot commit itself to a specific delivery schedule. In the
99. Frank E. Menard, ASBCA Dec. No. 1558 (1953) (defaulting contractor en-
couraged to continue, new costs sanctioned); The Aircraftsmen Co., ASBCA Dec. Nos.
3592 & 3965, 58-1 BCA 6247 (1958) (Government accepted deliveries which were
below minimum quantity requirements). See Cuneo, Waiver of the Due Date in
Government Contracts, 43 V.& L. RE-v. 1 (1957). If the original schedule has been
waived, the Government should establish a new schedule. See Harvey-Wells Elec-
tronics, ASBCA Dec. Nos. 4987 & 5053, 59-1 BCA 9536 (1959); Clad Int'l Corp.,
ASBCA Dec. No. 4813, 59-2 BCA 11015 (1959). Otherwise, the contractor must be
given a reasonable time in which to perform. Coy C. Goodrich, ASBCA Dec. Nos.
2760 & 2761, 58-1 BCA 5967 (1958); Bienenfeld Glass & Mirrors Co., ASBCA Dec.
No. 3568, 57-2 BCA 4967 (1957).
100. When a firm delivery schedule has been established, time is of the essence
and the entire contract may be terminated for a failure to meet any one of the
delivery dates. Fashion Sports Shoe Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 2546, 6 CCF ff 61920
(1955). Cf. Greenstreet, Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 3137, 59-1 BCA 8926 (1959) (right
to terminate under paragraph (a)(i) exists at any delivery date). Stronger reasons
for requiring strict adherence may exist when the contractor again defaults on the
new delivery schedule. See Sol. 0. Schlesinger, ASBCA Dec. No. 2947 (1955).
101. See Bolinders Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 2457 (1955):
There is no provision in the contract that requires appellant's ability financially
to perform to be maintained at any particular standard and the decision ...
that appellant was in default merely by reason of the fact that it failed to show
improvement in its financial ability, is in error.
102. Manhattan Lighting Equipment Go., ASBCA Dec. No. 5113, 60-1 BCA
13113 (1960). Whether a failure to make progress actually endangers performance
may depend upon whether the contract calls for readily obtainable supplies or
technically complicated articles of manufacture.
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absence of an actual failure to deliver on time - in which case termi-
nation would be possible under subparagraph (a) (i) -the con-
tracting officer normally cannot issue the 10-day notice which is
prerequisite for default termination under subparagraph (a)(ii)
until it is apparently impossible for the contractor to perform within
the terms of the contract.
Even in a case in which a contractor admits its financial inability
and repudiates the contract, it is not clear under the terms of sub-
paragraph (a) (i) that default results. Thus, despite an urgent need
for the supplies, the contracting officer in the Security Signals case
did not terminate the contract until the 10-day notice requirement
of subparagraph (a) (ii) had been satisfied. This hesitancy to termi-
nate the contract for default is perhaps justified by a literal reading
of the default clause, but it certainly is not well founded in the de-
cisions of the ASBCA.
The logical starting point in a discussion of the ASBCA decisions
is The Cowan Company,103 basically a "how not to do it" decision.
In Cowan, the contractor repudiated several contracts less than 10
days before the first deliveries were due. Relying upon subparagraph
(a) (i) in his written notice, the contracting officer immediately ter-
minated the contracts for default and repurchased the supplies,
charging excess costs to the contractor.
On appeal, the ASBCA held that the contract terminations and
the subsequent assessments of excess costs were improper:
The contracting officer's hasty actions in terminating the contracts prior
to the time for performance cannot be justified on the theory of anticipatory
breach since the method for termination of the. contracts relied upon by
the contracting officer is specifically set forth in subparagraph (a) (i) of the
Default article. It is well settled that remedies exist for anticipatory breah
of contract; the contracting offlicer, however, in this case chose to terminate
the contracts pursuant to subparagraph (a) (i) of the Default article. In our
opinion terminations of the contracts under the circumstances in this case
were not authorized under the provisions of paragraph (a). . . .The as-
sessment of excess costs of reprocurement is predicated on a proper exercise
of the right to terminate as set forth in paragraph (c). . . . Since the
terminations were not authorized, the Government's rights to assess excess
costs pursuant to paragraph (c) [now paragraph (b)] are precluded.104
103. ASBCA Dec. Nos. 2373 & 2374, 6 CCF 61821 (1955).
104. Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The Cowan case was subsequently reconsidered
by the ASBCA in an unpublished opinion dated January 24, 1956. In affirming its
earlier decision, the ASBCA distinguished Belt-Rite Leather Goods, ASBCA Dec.
No. 2473 (1955), a case which was decided after the original Cowan decision. The
ASBCA had held in Belt-Rite that a contractor's request for cancellation of its
contract constituted a waiver of the 10-day notice requirement of subparagraph
(a)(ii) of the default clause; consequently, the contracting officer's action in termi-
nating the contract was proper and the contractor was liable for excess costs of
repurchase. In Cowan, however, the ASBCA found a repudiation rather than a
request for cancellation, and since the delivery of a 10-day notice was "obviously
impossible under the circumstances" of the Cowan case, the contractor's repudiation
1082 [Vol. 44:1055
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While Cowan's practical lesson for contract administrators is clear,
its broader implication is that paragraph (a) provides no authority
to terminate immediately for anticipatory repudiation. If this con-
clusion were valid, the contracting officer would be required to
choose between issuing a 10-day notice and waiting until a failure to
deliver actually occurs. However, this broader implication of Cowan
has been effectively dispelled by a more recent decision, The Air-
craftsmen Company- 0 5
In the Aircraftsmen case, the ASBCA approved the action of the
contracting officer in terminating the contract forthwith when the
contractor admitted its financial inability, even though there was
arguably no default under subparagraph (a) (i).'0° Although the
contractor did not positively repudiate in Aircraftsmen, the ASBCA
reasoned that admitted financial inability was tantamount to repu-
diation, giving the Government an immediate cause of action. 07 The
ASBCA did not identify the source of this cause of action, but
merely distinguished Cowan as a case in which the contracting offi-
cer improperly relied upon subparagraph (a) (i) in an anticipatory
breach situation. Thus jurisdiction was taken to examine the pro-
priety of the termination without questioning whether the authority
to terminate was derived from the contract or from the common-law
did not constitute a waiver of notice. But see Trand Plastics Co., ASBCA Dec. No.
8708, 57-1 BCA 3297 (1957) (where repudiation is positive and unconditional,
10-day notice is a useless gesture which is not required).
105. ASBCA Dec. Nos. 3592 & 8965, 58-1 BCA 6247 (1958).
106. In Greenstreet, Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 3137, 59-1 BCA 8926 (1959), the
contractor coupled a failure to deliver on time with financial inability as defined
in Aircraftsnen. The ASBCA was correct in holding that the contract was properly
terminated under subparagraph (a) (i), but confused the issue by references to
anticipatory breach. From the standpoints of both practicality and theory, the
contractor's failure to deliver on time in Greenstreet was a present breach rather
than an anticipatory breach.
107. The classic case for application of the doctrine of anticipatory breach occurs
when a promisor, without failing to render a promised performance and while there
is yet performance due from the promisee, shows the promisee by word or deed that
he is unwilling or unable to render a promised performance not yet due. See REsTATE-
19 N CoNTACTS § 818 (Supp. 1948); 5 WILL~STON, CONmacrS § 1296 (2d ed.
1937). See Fairbanks & Speidel, Anticipatory Breach-Contracting Of icer's Dilem-
ma, 6 MmrrAIIY L. y. 129 (1959). For cear cases of repudiation, see David R.
Levin, ASBCA Dec. No. 5077, 59-1 BOA 8702 (1959); Trand Plastics Co., ASBCA
Dec. No. 3708, 57-1 BCA 3297 (1957); Old Home Milk Co., ASBCA Dec. Nos.
2594 & 2666 (1955); The Cowan Co., ASBCA Dec. Nos. 2873 & 2374, 6 CCF I[
61821 (1955). But cf. Manhattan Lighting Equipment Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 5118,
60-1 BCA 18113 (1960) (mere admission of financial hardship if performance were
completed is not repudiation). The difficulty in Aircraftsnen was that the contractor,
although financially incapacitated, did not repudiate the contract. However, it is
possible to argue by analogy to insolvency cases that financial inability to perform
-without actual repudiation of the contract- is sufficient to constitute a present,
material breach of an implied promise not to become incapacitated from performing.
See Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Assn, 240 U.S. 581 (1916) (involun-
tary bankruptcy); Pennsylvania Exch. Bank v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 629 (Ct.
Cl. 1959) (assignment for benefit of creditors).
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rights reserved to the Government by paragraph (f) of the default
clause. Yet, as was pointed out earlier, 08 the ASBCA has no juris-
diction over controversies arising pursuant to paragraph (f) termi-
nations.
In David R. Levin, 0 9 the contractor agreed to make daily milk
deliveries to an Army installation. After several deliveries bad been
made, the state milk commission suspended the contractor's li-
cense because of the very poor financial position of the contractor.
Consequently, the contractor refused to make the remaining de-
liveries. Relying upon this refusal, the contracting officer-without
any formal action -treated the contract as terminated and imme-
diately established a new source of supply, at excess costs to the
Government.
Upon appeal by the contractor, the ASBCA sustained the con-
tracting officer's action as follows:
There is no question as to whether the contractor was in default in view
of its advice that its last delivery would be on 6 November 1957 because it
was losing its licenses. As to the anticipatory breach aspect, see . .. Air-
craftsmen .... The nature of the procurement and the necessity for a
daily supply of milk at Fort Story fully justifies and explains the prompt
action of the contracting officer in effecting reprocurement. In so doing the
Government objectively treated the contractor's right to perform as termi-
nated for default and acted in reliance on the contractor's admitted in-
ability to perform. The [contractor's notice to the contracting officer] . . .
placed the contractor in a default status and in our opinion rendered a
formal termination by the Government unnecessary in order for the con-
tracting officer to treat the right to perform as terminated and to effect
reprocurement.110
In view of Aircraftsmen and David R. Levin, therefore, the ad-
mitted financial inability and repudiation by the contractor in Se-
curity Signals would have supported an immediate termination and
repurchase by the contracting officer. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that such precipitate action is justifiable only when the con-
tractor actually repudiates the contract or is obviously and positively
incapacitated from performing in accordance with the contract.""'
The result reached by the ASBCA in Aircraftsmen and in David
R. Levin is unquestionably sound from the standpoint of realistic
contract administration, for if a contractor clearly will be unable to
perform on time, the giving of a 10-day notice is a useless gesture." 2
108. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
109. ASBCA Dec. No. 5077, 59-1 BCA 8702 (1959).
110. Id. at 8705-06.
111. See note 107 supra.
112. See Trand Plastics Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 3708, 57-1 BCA 3297 (1957).
Cf. Conti v. United States, 158 F.2d 581 (1st Cir. 1946) (repudiation before per-
formance is undertaken relieves Government of contractual duty to issue written
termination notice). The Government, of course, may elect to continue performance
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While recognizing business realities, however, the ASBCA has neg-
lected to explain the basis of its jurisdiction to consider the merits
of both termination of contract and assessment of excess costs. Since
the jurisdiction of the ASBCA is limited to matters arising from the
contract itself, one might well conclude that the ASBCA has written
into the default clause a "subparagraph (a) (iii)," which authorizes
termination for "repudiation or admitted financial inability." If the
ASBCA's decisions are to be explained on the basis of existing con-
tract provisions, however, it seems better to theorize that the ad-
mission of financial inability and repudiation of a contract are so
repugnant to the possibility of performance within the terms of the
contract that the contractor may be deemed to have waived the 10-
day notice requirement. Use of the waiver theory places termination
authority in subparagraph (a) (ii), without unduly straining the
jurisdiction of the ASBCA. It further reduces Cowan to merely a
warning that subclause (a) (i) is not proper authority for termi-
nation in cases of repudiation prior to the delivery date.
V. FiNNcA1L INABIn AND
ExcusABLE CAUSE
At the date of termination for default, Security Signals had a poor
credit rating and less than $500 in cash. Further, it was contemplat-
ing the sale of capital equipment to finance the performance of two
other Government contracts. In order to avoid excess costs of $12,071
and to obtain a "termination for convenience" settlement, Security
Signals appealed to the ASBCA, arguing that its financial inability
was due to causes beyond its control and without its fault or
negligence."13
after the repudiation. See Paint & Pack Corp., ASBCA Dec. No. 1341 (1953). But
cf. United States v. Seacoast Gas Co., 204 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 866 (1953) (Government gave contractor three days to retract repudiation,
then elected to treat breach as final).
113. See note 94 supra. The contractor may raise the question of "excusability"
under paragraph (c) of the default clause in a timely appeal from either the
termination notice or the assessment of excess costs. Virginia Dare Extract Co.,
ASBCA Dec. No. 4916, 59-1 BCA 9560 (1959); Fulford Mfg., ASBCA Dec. Nos.
2143 & 2144, 6 CCF ff 61815 (1955). Cf. Oxygen Equipment Service, ASBCA Dec.
No. 5690, 60-1 BCA 11843 (1960) (contractor must appeal within 30 days of
assessment even though no express determination of inexcusability was made);
Maudlin & Son, ASBCA Dec. No. 2027, 6 CCF ff 61610 (1954) (contractor must
appeal from separate determination of inexcusability). Regardless of when the issue
is raised, if the default was excusable the contractor is entitled to a termination-for-
convenience settlement. Carl W. Schutter Indus., ASBCA Dec. No. 3867, 59-2 BCA
11120 (1959). The contractor may also question the propriety of the assessment of
excess costs in a timely appeal from that determination. Maximoff Research Co.,
ASBCA Dec. No. 5074, 59-2 BCA 10234 (1959) (Government properly repur-
chased similar supplies and services); Office Equipment Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 5040,
59-2 BCA 10893 (1959) (Government failed to mitigate damages); Bar-Ray Prods.,
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The ASBCA found that Security Signals' failure to perform was
not excusable, and denied the appeal. The ASBCA's reasoning on
this question was as follows:
In order to sustain this appeal, we would have to affirmatively find that
the failure to perform arose out of causes beyond the control and without
the fault or negligence of the appellant. We have studied the record care-
fully and are unable to make that finding. We are not persuaded that before
bidding appellant made reasonable arrangements for financing should the
contract be awarded, arrangements of such definiteness that they could
reasonably be relied upon. Nor are we persuaded that the bank's actions
after bid and award were due to causes beyond appellants control and with-
out appellants fault or negligence. 114
In view of the economic impact of this decision upon Security
Signals and its implications for other small-business contractors, a
detailed examination of the excusability problem seems appropriate.
In approaching the problem of excusability, the primary legal
question is the extent to which the Government has, by adopting
the provisions of paragraph (c) of the default clause, assumed the
risk of a contractor's financial inability to perform."' The resolution
of this question depends, first of all, upon a determination of whether
the contractor has obtained resources which are adequate, in the
light of business custom and practice, to finance all expected costs
of performance." 6 These resources may be obtained from private or
governmental sources and may consist of either cash on hand or
credit, but they must be available at the date of contract award."17
ASBCA Dec. No. 3065, 57-2 BCA 5209 (1957) (Government failed to mitigate
damages). See Van Cleve, supra note 96.
114. Security Signals, Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 4634, 58-2 BCA 8575, 8591 (1958).
115. The purpose of the Government in assuming risks which would otherwise be
on the contractor is to get the benefit of lower prices on its many defense contracts.
United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120 (1943). Paragraph (c) of the
current default clause for fixed-price supply contracts excuses certain performance
failures which are "beyond the control and without the fault or negligence" of
the contractor. See Appendix. Earlier versions of the default clause contained the
additional requirement that the cause of default be "unforeseeable." This of course
increased the difficulty of being excused for defaults caused by financial inability.
See Oakland Truck Sales, ASBCA Dec. Nos. 560, 561, 573, 687 & 690 (1951);
Modem Plastics Mfg., ASBCA Dec. No. 351 (1950). Cf. 39 DEcs. Co M. GEN.
478 (1959).
116. David R. Levin, ASBCA Dec. No. 5077, 59-1 BCA 8702 (1959); West
Coast Lumber Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 1131 (1953). See Herman Adams, ASBCA
Dec. No. 2555 (1955) (financial ability is the exclusive responsibility of the con-
tractor).
117.
It is believed to be settled law that financial weakness, existing at the time of
bid and award, which would endanger performance, is not an excusable cause
for failure to carry out the contract. The reason is self-evident. Such financial
weakness should be remedied before the contract is made or if that is impossible
the contract should not be executed.
Office Equipment Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 4648, 58-1 BCA 6544, 6546 (1958). For
the nature of commitments or arrangements which are deemed adequate, see Typo
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If the ASBCA determines that the contractor did not have adequate
financial resources at the time of award, a performance failure
caused by financial inability will not be excused.-""
If the contractor had adequate financing at the date of contract
award, the next question is whether the deterioration of that con-
dition was excusable. A prerequisite to excusability is that the
financial deterioration produce complete inability to perform; if con-
tinued performance means only financial hardship or loss, the risk
must be borne by the contractor." 9 Even if performance is im-
possible, the cause must be beyond the contractor's control and
without its fault or negligence. Thus if financial inability is caused
by negligent performance,1 °20 by mistakes in business judgment,12
or by overextended capacity, 22 the default is not excusable.
In theory, financial inability which is caused either by any of
several factors enumerated in paragraph (c) of the default clause
or by similar factors ought to be excusable if beyond the contractor's
control and without its fault or negligence.2 3 In practice, however,
Machine Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 3214, 57-1 BCA 3863 (1957) (loan conditionally
approved by the SBA); Valley Forge & Car Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 1924 (1956)
(promise of bank to finance contract); Bernal Narrow Fabrics, ASBCA Dec. No. 1604
(1953) (promise by supplier to extend credit); West Coast Lumber Co., ASBCA
Dec. No. 1131 (1951) (good credit, assignment of receivable to bank). But see
R. P. Bennett Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 3738, 57-1 BCA 3812 (1957) (firm commit-
ment at time of award not sufficient to excuse default where bank was within
rights in refusing to supply additional working capital).
There is a close parallel between the standard of excusability and that which
ought to guide the contracting officer in his pre-award determination of financial
responsibility. See text supra at note 27.
118. See, e.g., R. P. Bennett Co., supra note 117; Newark Weaving Mills,
ASBCA Dec. No. 3026, 6 CCF ff 61951 (1956).
119. Republic Electric & Mfg. Corp., ASBCA Dec. No. 4354, 59-1 BCA 9968
(1959) (mere financial hardship is insufficient to excuse performance); Old Home
Milk Co., ASBCA Dec. Nos. 2594 & 2666 (1955); National Magnet Wire Corp.,
ASBCA Dec. No. 593 (1951) (financial hardship short of inability, even though beyond
contractor's control, does not excuse default); Riverside Screw Prods., ASBCA Dec.
No. 354 (1950). But see Sterling Precision Corp., ASBCA Dec. No. 4646, 59-2 BCA
10911 (1959) (cost-plus-fixed-fee contractor may stop work when actual costs
exceed estimates).
120. Irwin Tool Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 2490, 6 CCF ir 61674 (1955) (mismanage-
ment); J & L Supply & Equipment Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 1400 (1954) (negligence
in maintaining machinery).
121. Trand Plastics Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 3708, 57-1 BCA 3297 (1957); Inter-
state Box Corp., ASBCA Dec. Nos. 2963 & 3013, 57-1 BCA 3134 (1957); Herman
Adams, ASBCA Dec. No. 2555 (1955); Eagle Classon Machine Co., ASBCA Dec.
No. 1280 (1953) (original bid unrealistic or underpriced). See Bernal Narrow
Fabrics, ASBCA Dec. No. 1604 (1953) (no reasonable assurance of ability to meet
financial obligations).
122. Selectar Indus., ASBCA Dec. No. 1635, 6 CCF II 61769 (1953).
123. No case has been discovered in which a contractor was excused for financial
inability, except where the default was caused either by acts of the Government or
by defaults of subcontractors. However, there have been decisions indicating that
other causes would be recognized if properly presented to the ASBCA. See, e.g.,
Hercules Food Serv. Equip., ASBCA Dec. No. 3875, 57-1 BCA 4267 (1957) (no
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the only causal factors accepted by the ASBCA have been two of
the enumerated ones: "defaults of subcontractors," and "acts of the
Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity."' 24
A. Acts of the Government
When the finances of defense contractors are unstable, contract
administrators have a difficult problem. Often, the thin line between
default and successful performance is maintained only by the con-
tracting officer's prompt and complete action, particularly where
payment and financial assistance are involved. Nevertheless, a
contractor may rightfully insist upon a high standard of contract
administration.2 5 Thus, defaults caused by financial inability have
been excused where the Government failed to pay invoices within
a reasonable time, 2 6 or where the Government improperly delayed
evidence to support allegation that default was caused by strikes and work stop-
pages).
124. The United States is not liable to private contractors for damages caused
by public and general acts of the Government in its sovereign capacity. Horowitz v.
United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1924). Cf. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
The line between acts in a contractual capacity and acts in a sovereign capacity is
often difficult to draw. See Miller v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 1 (1956); Derector
v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 812 (1954). See also Stack, The Liability of the United
States for Breach of Contract, 44 GEo. L.J. 77 (1955).
125. Q.V.S., Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 3722, 58-2 BCA 8332 (1958) (improper
progress-payment administration placed additional strain on contractor's already
attenuated financial condition); Mifflinburg Body Works, ASBCA Dec. No. 723, 5
CCF ff 61276 (1951). In the case of Bolinders Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 2457 (1955),
the Government was criticized for paradoxical conduct in dealing with a contractor
in financial distress. (While suspending progress payments the contracting officer
urged further performance, and while issuing a 10-day notice of termination he
proposed a new delivery schedule.) However, the Bolinders decision was concerned
with the propriety of a termination rather than excusability of an alleged default.
126. The importance of prompt partial payments to a contractor in financial
distress is obvious. The Government, therefore, is under a duty to pay vouchers
within a reasonable time. If an unwarranted delay causes financial inability, the
contractor will be excused. See George E. Martin, ASBCA Dec. No. 3117 (1956)
(delay of more than 30 days was unreasonable); Paint & Pack Corp., ASBCA Dec.
No. 1841 (1953) (where contractor was on verge of financial inability. Government's
remedy was termination for default, not the wrongful withholding of payments due).
See also West Coast Lumber Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 1131 (1953); Mifllinburg Body
Works, supra note 125. But see Oakland Truck Sales, ASBCA Dec. Nos. 560, 561,
573, 687, 690 (1951) (dictum that Government may withhold from payments due
the contractor an amount equal to estimated excess costs of repurchase upon con-
tractor's anticipated default).
The current "payments clause" for fixed-price supply contracts contains the fol-
lowing provision:
The Contractor shall be paid, upon the submission of proper invoices or vouch-
ers, the prices stipulated herein for supplies delivered and accepted or services
rendered and accepted, less deductions, if any, as herein provided. Unless
otherwise specified, payment will be made on partial deliveries accepted by the
Government when the amount due on such deliveries so warrants; or, when
requested by the Contractor, payment for accepted partial deliveries shall be
made whenever such payment would equal or exceed either $1,000 or 50
percent of the total amount of this contract.
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or suspended promised financial assistance.127
The language "acts of the Government" is not limited to the
agency administering the contract, nor is it restricted to a particular
contract. Financial inability has been excused where governmental
agencies other than the military departments have failed to provide
promised financial assistance to a defense contractor,128 or where
improper administration of other Government contracts being per-
formed by the contractor caused the default in question.2 9 The gist
of these decisions is that if the Government obligates itself to pro-
vide a portion of the contractor's financial resources, any improper
or dilatory contract administration which causes financial inability
will excuse the default.
The Government's initial determination of "responsibility" is not
an act which will excuse a subsequent default, for a defective de-
termination does not breach any contractual duty to the prospective
contractor. The Government determines financial responsibility prior
to award in order to protect its own interest. Consequently, financial
resources which were deemed adequate for a determination of re-
sponsibility may prove inadequate when the question of excusability
arises; and the fact that the contract was awarded is not conclusive
evidence of the contractor's financial ability to perform at the time
A.S.P.R. § 7-108.7, 2 Gov'T CoNT. EP'. ff 32670 (1960). Once the contract has
been terminated for default, the Government, as a general creditor, has broad powers
to set off the excess costs of repurchase against contract proceeds owed to the
contractor. See United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
127. Q.V.S., Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 3722, 58-2 BCA 8332 (1958). The Govern-
ment's obligation is determined by the progress-payment clause contained in the
prime contract. See A.S.P.R. app. E, § 510.1, 2 Gov'T CoNT. RE. ff 35756.30 (1959).
In Republic Electric & Mfg., ASBCA Dec. No. 4354, 59-1 BCA 9968 (1959), the
contractor was performing as a prime contractor, and as a subcontractor for the
Government. When the prime contract was terminated for financial inability, the
contractor argued that the cause of default was the Government's failure to make
prompt progress payments under the subcontract. The ASBCA rejected this argument
on the ground that there was no privity of contract between the Government and
the contractor in its capacity as a subcontractor. Consequently, there was no act
of the Government in its contractual capacity.
128. Transportation Seat Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 2161, 59-1 BCA 8857 (1959)
(RFC failed to pay promised loan, contractor not at fault); Typo Machine Co.,
ASBCA Dec. No. 3214, 57-1 BCA 3863 (1957) (SBA cancelled conditionally
approved loan, contractor not at fault). Cf. Israel's Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 1222
(1953) (contractor argued that default was caused by Federal Reserve Board's
increase of cash-reserve minimum for member banks, but ASBCA dismissed the
appeal on other grounds).
129. The Douglas Co., ASBCA Dec. Nos. 3349 & 3741, 58-1 BCA 6604 (1958)
(Government delayed in paying termination-for-convenience claims under two other
contracts); Valley Forge & Car Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 1924 (1956) (Government
failed to make prompt price adjustment under another contract); West Coast Lumber
Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 1181 (1953); Miffiinburg Body Works, ASBCA Dec. No.
723, 5 CCF f 61276 (1951) (delays and improper withholding of payments due
under series of contracts). But see Republic Electric & Mfg., ASBCA Dec. No. 4354,
59-1 BCA 9968 (1959) (contractor must be in privity of contract with Government).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1055
of award.130 The contractor cannot rely upon a determination of
financial responsibility, but must re-establish the fact of adequate
financing in excusability proceedings before the ASBCA. 131
B. Defaults of Subcontractors
One of the specifically enumerated causes upon which excus-
ability may be predicated is "defaults of subcontractors." The type
of subcontractor defaults with which the present discussion deals
is comprised of those which affect the prime contractor's financial
ability to perform. Typically, the issue arises when a subcontractor
fails to render a promised performance, forcing the prime contractor
to find an alternate source of supply.'32 For a small-business prime
contractor, performance may well be impossible if the price of the
alternate supplier is excessively high, or if no other subcontractor
can be found.
The ASBCA has consistently interpreted the default clause for
fixed-price supply contracts in effect prior to January, 1958, to ex-
cuse prime-contractor performance failures which were caused by
subcontractor defaults, provided only that those defaults were be-
yond the control and without the fault or negligence of the prime
contractor; the fact that the subcontractor's default was not excus-
able was immaterial. 3 3 The test applied by the ASBCA in evaluating
130. Although a contractor may be determined responsible and eligible for con-
tract award, this does not enlarge its actual capabilities, alter its contractual responsi-
bilities, or authorize extracontractual relief from its financial inability. See Emeco
Corp., ASBCA Dec. No. 4101, 59-2 BCA 10366 (1959) (SBA certificate of com-
petency is not conclusive of credit responsibility in excusability proceeding before
ASBCA); Trand Plastics Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 3708, 57-1 BCA 3297 (1957) (pre-
award survey is for benefit of Government and is not relevant in determination of
excusability for default); Irwin Tool Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 2490, 6 CCF ff 61674
(1955) (assuming that contracting officer erred in his determination of responsibility,
contractor knew more of its own financial condition and, by submitting a bid, know-
ingly invited error).
131. Emeco Corp., supra note 130.
132. Under paragraph (c) of the default clause, the prime contractor cannot
argue that a performance failure was caused by "defaults of subcontractors" without
first demonstrating that the supplies or services to be furnished by the subcontractor
were not available from other sources in sufficient time to permit the contractor to
meet the required delivery schedule. See United States v. Thompson, 168 F. Supp.
281 (N.D. W. Va. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1959).
133. Prior to January of 1958, the default clause provided that:
The Contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs, if any failure to perform
the contract arises out of causes beyond the control and without the fault or
negligence of the Contractor. Such causes include, but are not restricted to
. . . defaults of subcontractors due to any of such causes unless the Contract-
ing Officer shall determine that the supplies or services to be furnished by the
subcontractor were obtainable from other sources in sufficient time to permit
the Contractor to meet the required delivery schedule. [Emphasis added.]
In John Andresen Co., ASBCA Dec. No. 633, 5 CCF ir 61182 (1950), the ASBCA
interpreted this to mean that only the prime contractor's excusability was relevant,
and that the causes of subcontractor defaults were not limited to those enumerated
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the prime contractor's conduct was simple: Looking at the subcon-
tractor's business capacity, reliability, and general experience, would
a sound business man have selected that subcontractor to perform
the contract in question? 134 A good illustration of the application of
this test was provided by the case of Paromel Electronics Corpora-
tion. 135
Paromel, a small-business prime contractor, obtained a price quo-
tation from a subcontractor and relied upon that quotation in sub-
mitting the low bid on a small-business "set-aside" contract. After
the award was made to Paromel, the subcontractor discovered a
pricing error, repudiated the original quotation, and increased the
estimated price of performance. Unable to find an alternate source
of supply at a lower price, and faced with bankrupty if it attempted
to perform, 36 Paromel repudiated its contract with the Government.
As a result, the Government terminated the contract for default, re-
purchased the supplies, and assessed excess costs of approximately
$197,000.
On appeal by Paromel, the ASBCA found that in view of the facts
prevailing at the time of bid and award Paromel had obtained
adequate financing. Because Paromel's subsequent financial inability
was caused by the supplier's unexpected repudiation -and because
in the default clause. In practical effect, if the subcontractor's default was beyond
the prime contractor's control and without its fault or negligence, the prime con-
tractor's default was excusable, even though the subcontractor's default was not
excusable under the same standards. Accord, Firth Machine & Tool, ASBCA Dec.
No. 4600, 59-2 BCA 10311 (1959); Emeco Corp., ASBCA Dec. No. 4101, 59-2
BCA 10366 (1959); Ross-Mehan Foundries, ASBCA Dec. No. 4823, 59-1 BCA
9077 (1959); Paromel Electronics Corp., ASBCA Dec. Nos. 4025 & 4123, 57-2 BCA
5216 (1957), motion for reconsideration denied, 58-2 BCA 7281 (1958).
134. The prime contractor must obtain a subcontractor with capacity and credit,
must exercise reasonable diligence in supervising the subcontractor's performance,
and must make efforts to obtain an alternate source if the subcontractor defaults.
Modern Mfg., ASBCA Dec. No. 4086 (1957). Cf. Mann Chem. Lab., ASBCA Dec.
No. 1267 (1954). In addition, the prime contractor must assume the risk of selecting
an untried subcontractor. See Peoria Consolidated Mfrs., ASBCA Dec. No. 2409,
60-1 BCA 12128 (1960) (prime contractor delayed by subcontractor's develop-
mental difficulties with new welding process). If the prime contractor fails to meet
these standards or selects an inadequate subcontractor, a subsequent default caused
by the subcontractor will not be excused. See Sargent & Greenleaf, ASBCA Dec.
Nos. 1672 & 2174 (1956) (prime contractor selected subcontractor with inadequate
facilities); Newark Weaving Mills, ASBCA Dec. No. 3026, 6 CCF fr 61951 (1956)
(subcontractor's default caused by prime contractor's poor credit rating); Poloron
Prods. v. United States, 126 Ct. CL 816 (1953) (inexperienced prime contractor
awarded difficult project to inexperienced subcontractor). But see Whitlock v.
United States, 159 F. Supp. 602 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (Court of Claims rejects Andresen,
supra note 133).
135. ASBCA Dec. Nos. 4025 & 4123, 57-2 BCA 5216 (1957).
136. At the time of contract award, Paromel's net worth was $50,000 and ade-
quate financing bad been obtained to perform at the original contract price. At
the date of termination, Paromel's net worth was $30,000 and anticipated excess
costs were $197,000.
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Paromel had no reason to expect this conduct-the default was
excusable.13 7
In a motion for reconsideration, the Government argued that the
ASBCA had given undue preference to a small business, for had a
larger contractor been involved, the supplier's repudiation would
have caused only financial hardship rather than a total inability to
perform-in which case the contractor's default could not be ex-
cused.13 The ASBCA denied the Government's motion, reasoning
that "if the Government, out of its concern for the welfare of small
contractors, chooses to limit certain of its procurement to them to
the exclusion of larger operators, it can scarcely close its eyes to the
facts, the realities, and the hazards, implicit in its election to deal
with small business under its uniform and unchanged contract
provision." 1 39
The current default clause, as amended, would substantially
change the result obtained in Paromel Electronics and similar cases.
Under the amended clause, before the prime contractor's default
can be excused, the underlying defaults of subcontractors must also
be excusable within the meaning of paragraph ( C).140 Perhaps, as
one writer has suggested,' 4' the amended clause serves to prevent
collusion between prime contractors and subcontractors in avoiding
excess costs. But a literal application of the current clause may
produce some undesirable results. Clearly, Paromel Electronics-
and its realistic approach to the financial problems of small-business
contractors -is overruled. Paromel's default would not be excused
under the current default clause because the subcontractors pricing
error was within the control of the subcontractor and due to the
137. Paromel Electronics Corp., ASBCA Dec. Nos. 4025 & 4123, 57-2 BCA 5216
(1957).
138. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
139. Paromel Electronics Corp., ASBCA Dec. Nos. 4025 & 4123, 58-2 BCA 7281,
7284 (1958). However, the ASBCA purported to voice "no binding expression of
opinion on this phase of the controversy." Ibid.
140. Paragraph (c) of the current default clause provides that a prime contrac-
tor's failure to perform because of the default of a subcontractor will be excused
only if the subcontractor's default "arises out of causes beyond the control of both
the Contractor and the subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either
of them. ... See Appendix. In the few decisions to date, the ASBCA has given
effect to the literal meaning of the change. See Putnam Mills, ASBCA Dec. No.
5548, 60-1 BCA 11970 (1960); Michael A. Zielinski, ASBCA Dec. No. 5848, 60-1
BCA 12025 (1960); Alert Prods., ASBCA Dec. No. 5620, 59-2 BCA 11381 (1959).
The default clause for fixed-price construction contracts was not amended, and
still contains the same standards for excusing subcontractor defaults as did the old
default clause for supply contracts. See A.S.P.R. § 8-709, 2 Gov'T CoNT. Ria. f
32957 (1960). However, the General Accounting Office treats the construction-
contract default clause as if it had been amended, and has rejected the Andresen
interpretation. See 39 DEcs. ComI'. GCEN. 83 (1959).
141. See Wesselink, Prime Contractor's Responsibility to the Government as Af-
fected by the Subcontractors Default, 16 FED. B.J. 211 (1956).
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latter's fault or negligence. Thus, even though Paromel exercised
good business judgment in selecting the subcontractor, it would
(under the amended clause) be forced into bankrupty by the Gov-
enment's assessment of excess costs.1 42
The effect of the excusability amendment is to make the prime
contractor a virtual insurer of the selected subcontractor's business
conduct. This might be unobjectionable if the prime contractor were
permitted free and complete discretion in its selection of subcon-
tractors. But the Government has gradually increased its control of
the prime contractor's selection of subcontractors. The Government's
control is manifested in specifications which require the selection of
sole-source suppliers or limit the available sources of supply, and in
regulations which reserve authority to approve the prime contrac-
tor's "make or buy' procurement program and to review the qualifi-
cations of individual subcontractors. 43 Further, the Government has
been increasingly insistent that subcontracts be awarded to small
businesses or to businesses in labor-surplus areas. 44 All of this Gov-
ernment control reduces the freedom of choice which a prime
contractor ought to have in order to balance the risk of subcon-
tractor defaults assumed by the prime contractor under the current
default clause.
It is highly questionable whether any prime contractor-large
or small-should be made to bear the consequences of a default
by a subcontractor when the Government has either required the
selection of that particular subcontractor or refused to approve
suppliers chosen by the prime contractor. Admittedly, a major pur-
pose of governmental control in this area is to reduce the risks of
unrealistic pricing and of failures in performance; perhaps the prime
contractor will benefit from this control in the long run. Neverthe-
less, the current default clause does not protect the prime contractor
that has exercised good business judgment or has been required to
142. A firm price quotation is not essential to a determination of excusability of
a subcontractor's default. The ASBCA has recognized that "in order to obtain 'firm'
commitments the bidder would normally be obliged also to commit itself uncondi-
tionally to acceptance before it knows whether it will receive a contract or not.
Such business dealing would be not only improvident but, as to small operators,
nothing short of suicidal." Paromel Electronics Corp., ASBCA Dec. Nos. 4025 &
4123, 58-2 BCA 7281, 7282 (1958). See also Arlington Sales Agency, ASBCA Dec.
No. 1704 (1954). For an indication of the flexibility permitted in the pre-award
price quotations of subcontractors, see 39 DECS. CoMi. GEN. 343 (1959). The
subcontractor may be liable to the prime contractor for damages if the pre-award
bid is repudiated after the prime contractor has relied thereon and received the
contract award. Heifetz Metal Co. v. Peter Kiewit Sons, 264 F.2d 435 (8th Cir.
1959); Hickerson v. Logan-Long Co., 183 F. Supp. 562 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
143. See notes 21 & 22 supra.
144. See note 24 supra. See also Hellerstein & Speidel, Government Assistance




select a supplier of questionable ability. Large prime contractors
can compensate for losses sustained as a result of subcontractor de-
faults by the simple expedient of raising their bids on future con-
tracts. For the small-business prime contractor, however, one costly
default may make subsequent participation in defense procurement
impossible.
C. Security Signals in Perspective
In Security Signals, the ASBCA determined that "before bidding
[the contractor had not] ...made reasonable arrangements for
financing should the contract be awarded, arrangements of such
definiteness that they could reasonably be relied upon." 45 Accept-
ing the ASBCA's factual determination, its allocation of costs ap-
pears sound. The Government, regardless of its sympathy with small
business, should not be required to absorb the risk of dealing with
poorly financed contractors - and this risk is undoubtedly increased
when a definite commitment for financing has not been obtained at
the time of contract award. However, the ASBCA's apparent empha-
sis upon arrangements at the time of bidding seems misplaced.
While it may be wise to have financing when the bid is submitted,
the crucial date for purposes of excusability is the date of award.'46
Clearly, the fact that a contractor had no reasonable arrangements
for financing at the time of bidding would not preclude a finding of
excusability if financing had in fact been obtained prior to award.
After determining that Security Signals did not have adequate
arrangements for financing at the time of bidding, the ASBCA went
on to find that the bank's post-award refusal to provide financing
did not excuse the contractor's financial inability to perform.147 This
suggests that if the bank's refusal had been an excusable cause of
default, the appeal would have been sustained- despite the fact
that Security Signals did not have adequate financing at the time of
award. In view of prior decisions, however, the finding of inade-
quate financing at the time of award made it unnecessary to consider
whether Security Signals' failure to obtain financing after award was
excusable. 48
For purposes of excusability, therefore, if a contractor has not
obtained reasonably reliable financing by the time of award, that
contractor has not satisfied its contractual responsibility. This holds
true although the contractor had been determined financially re-
sponsible for purposes of award and was later prevented from ob-
145. Security Signals, Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 4634, 58-2 BCA 8575, 8591 (1958).
146. See note 117 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 15 & 17 supra.
147. See Security Signals, Inc., ASBCA Dec. No. 4634, 58-2 BCA 8575, 8591
(1958).
148. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
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taining working capital solely by causes beyond its control and
without its fault or negligence. Even if financial arrangements have
been obtained at the time of award, the ASBCA has excused the
defaults of prime contractors only when those defaults stemmed
from "acts of the Government in its contractual capacity" or from
"defaults of subcontractors"- and recent amendment of the default
clause has reduced the protective effect of the latter cause.
The foregoing discussion suggests an interesting - albeit hypothet-
ical- question regarding the Security Signals case. Suppose that Se-
curity Signals had obtained a definite commitment from the bank
prior to award of the contract, and that Security Signals' subsequent
failure to obtain working capital was beyond its control and without
its fault or negligence. Would the wrongful act of a commercial
bank constitute an excusable cause under paragraph (c) of the de-
fault clause? The default clause specifically states that the excusable
causes of default are not restricted to those enumerated in para-
graph (c). Therefore, if a non-enumerated cause is alleged by the
prime contractor in its excusability appeal, the immediate question
for the ASBCA is whether the cause alleged can be equated to any
of those which are enumerated. 49
Unfortunately, there is very little basis for comparison between
"acts of a commercial bank" and the specific circumstances listed in
paragraph (c) of the default clause. Consequently, if the excus-
ability of a non-enumerated cause of default is not to be settled by
a mechanical exercise in semantics, the ASBCA must look to the
policies underlying Government procurement. For example, the
ASBCA ought to consider whether governmental absorption of the
risk involved will result in lower bids on future contracts. More im-
portant, the ASBCA ought to examine closely the immediate effect
upon the contractor of a negative determination of excusability. If
the ASBCA determines that "acts of a commercial bank" constitute
an inexcusable cause of default, it automatically favors the con-
tractor that is wholly reliant upon Government financing over the
contractor that has secured private financing-for if financing is
subsequently denied wrongfully to both contractors, the former will
be excused while the latter is left to bear the burden of excess costs
and the stigma of default termination. This result is certainly at
variance with the Government's policy of encouraging contractors
to rely primarily upon private financing.
Although the precise issue has not yet been presented to the
ASBCA, it is suggested that if a contractor has been able to obtain
adequate financial resources which later are wrongfully withheld,
149. For a discussion of the cases defining excusable cause under paragraph (c) of
the default clause, see 39 DECS. Com'. GEN. 343 (1959) (unforeseen shortage
of materials in market equated to enumerated causes).
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default attributable to the latter cause ought to be excused. It may
not be easy to justify such a decision in terms of lower contract
prices to the Government, but if the Government is to keep faith
with those small-business contractors which have honestly endeav-
ored to perform without governmental assistance, there can be no
other decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
In March of 1957, Security Signals Corporation -a small-business
prime contractor of demonstrated ability-had a cash position of
$30,000, enjoyed a harmonious relationship with a bank which had
provided working capital on several occasions, and was successfully
performing two defense contracts. Six months later, Security Signals
had less than $500 in cash, possessed no credit, owed the Govern-
ment approximately $12,000 for excess costs of reprocurement, and
was forced to sell capital equipment to remain in business. The
primary cause of this financial deterioration was a lack of adequate
working capital.
Security Signals made a fatal error in not obtaining a firm com-
mitment for financing from the bank prior to contract award. The
"harmonious relationship" with the bank could not be expected to
survive Security Signals' insistence upon making capital improve-
ments of which the bank disapproved, and especially was this true
in the period of tight money which then prevailed. As a result, Se-
curity Signals was inadequately financed at the time of award and
was, as a consequence, contractually liable to the Government for
excess costs. The practical lesson to be drawn from this case study
is that a small-business prime contractor should never undertake a
Defense Department fixed-price supply contract unless adequate,
firm commitments for financing have been obtained, whether from
private or governmental sources.
Why did the Government's program of financial assistance fail in
the Security Signals case? The obvious answer is that Government
assistance was first requested at a time when governmental aid was
either imprudent or impossible. Defense-contract financing was
denied by the Government because the danger of monetary loss
outweighed the probability of successful performance. The Small
Business Administration (SBA) could not move fast enough to pre-
vent a termination for default. In view of the purpose of defense-
contract financing -which is to assure timely performance at the
lowest possible cost- the Government's denial of this type of fi-
nancial assistance cannot be severely criticized. Considering the
broader purpose of SBA financial assistance to small business, how-
ever, the inability of this contractor to receive a timely decision
from the SBA on the loan application was unfortunate.
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Equally unfortunate is the fact that if Security Signals had
chosen to ask the Government for financial assistance prior to award,
most forms of defense-contract financing would have been available
and could have been adapted to meet increased needs during per-
formance of the contract. From this state of affairs emerges the
distinct possibility that a contractor which has successfully obtained
private financing for a Government contract may be in more diffi-
culty, should financial difficulties arise during performance of its
contract, than a contractor which-through necessity or design-
has relied upon Government financing from the very beginning. This
anomaly persists despite the Government's avowed preference for
private financing at reasonable rates.
Although the Government was not contractually responsible for
the default of Security Signals, the Government contributed to that
default by acts and omissions which were outside its contractual
capacity. One such governmental act was that of the contracting
officer in determining that Security Signals was a responsible bidder,
thereby permitting Security Signals to undertake performance with-
out an adequate, firm, financial arrangement. Arguably, the facts
provided a reasonable basis for this administrative action. Further,
a rejection of Security Signals as not responsible would have re-
quired thorough documentation of the contracting officer's action
and submission of the case to the SBA-both of which are time
consuming processes. Regardless of these factors, however, the in-
terests of both the Government and the small-business contractor
would be better protected if a commitment or explicit arrangement
for financing were required at the pre-award determination of
responsibility. The importance of an adequate, pre-award financial
evaluation by the contracting officer cannot be overemphasized.
Another governmental act or omission instrumental in Security
Signals' default was attributable to the SBA, rather than to the
military department administering the contract. A prospective small-
business defense contractor which cannot obtain private financing
may apply to the SBA for either a participation or a direct loan. If
not discouraged by the two- to six-month processing delay, the
applicant has better than a 50-per-cent chance of success. However,
SBA assistance is unavailable if actual need does not exist, and -as
Security Signals demonstrates-if that need first arises during per-
formance of the contract, the SBA may be unable to act with suffi-
cient dispatch to save the contractor from default.
It is apparent that SBA financial assistance is of limited value to
the small-business contractor that obtains private financing prior to
award and then develops an acute need for financing during actual
performance of the contract. To fill this gap in the Government's
over-all program of financial aid to small businesses, the SBA should
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consider the adoption of a new procedure for financing small busi-
nesses engaged in the performance of defense contracts. A prospec-
tive prime contractor or subcontractor should be permitted to apply
for a conditional loan without having to show actual need. The
application would be processed immediately, policy decisions would
be made, and the loan would be conditionally approved in the
estimated amount required to finance performance of the contract
in question. If private financing subsequently proved inadequate,
the SBA -after quickly updating the contractor's financial con-
dition- could then make a direct loan of working capital to the
extent of the contractor's actual need for working capital.
The primary goal of Government financial assistance is to obtain
the timely delivery of quality supplies at a reasonable price. When
a small-business contractor is involved, the achievement of this goal
requires prompt and conscientious action by contract administrators
and demands the full utilization of the SBA's potential. If partici-
pation in defense procurement is to benefit small business, the Gov-
ernment's concern for the welfare of small business must not stop
with the award of a contract. This point is strikingly illustrated by
the Security Signals case. The military department involved in that
case permitted an inadequately financed, small-business contractor
to undertake performance of the contract, and subsequently deter-
mined that it was imprudent to help the contractor out of its finan-
cial difficulties. Even more disturbing was the SBA's inability to
reach a timely decision on the merits of Security Signals' request
for assistance. It is indeed strange that the very agency which was
created by Congress to foster and protect small business should be
unable to provide financial assistance at the time when it is needed
most- at the critical stage where Defense Department financing
is imprudent and private financing unavailable. In the Security Sig-
nals case, this failure resulted in the default and near-bankruptcy
of a capable, small-business contractor.
APPEND3X
8-707 Default Clause for Fixed-Price Supply Contracts.
The following clause shall be used in all fixed-price supply contracts
as defined in ASPR 7-102.
DEFAULT
(a) The Government may, subject to the provisions of paragraph (c) below,
by written notice of default to the Contractor, terminate the whole or any part
of this contract in any one of the following circumstances:
(i) if the Contractor fails to make delivery of the supplies or to perform
the services within the time specified herein or any extension thereof; or
(ii) if the Contractor fails to perform any of the other provisions of this
contract, or so fails to make progress as to endanger performance of this contract
in accordance with its terms, and in either of these two circumstances does not
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cure such failure within a period of 10 days (or such longer period as the Con-
tracting Officer may authorize in writing) after receipt of notice from the
Contracting Officer specifying such failure.
(b) In the event the Government terminates this contract in whole or in part
as provided in paragraph (a) of this clause, the Government may procure, upon
such terms and in such manner as the Contracting Officer may deem appropriate,
supplies or services similar to those so terminated, and the Contractor shall be
liable to the Government for any excess costs for such similar supplies or services:
Provided, That the Contractor shall continue the performance of this contract to
the extent not terminated under the provisions of this clause.
(c) Except with respect to defaults of subcontractors, the Contractor shall
not be liable for any excess costs if the failure to perform the contract arises out
of causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Con-
tractor. Such causes may include, but are not restricted to, acts of God or of the
public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual ca-
pacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes,
and unusually severe weather; but in every case the failure to perform must be
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor. If the
failure to perform is caused by the default of a subcontractor, and if such default
arises out of causes beyond the control of both the Contractor and subcontractor,
and without the fault or negligence of either of them, the Contractor shall not be
liable for any excess costs for failure to perform, unless the supplies or services
to be furnished by the subcontractor were obtainable from other sources in
sufficient time to permit the Contractor to meet the required delivery schedule.
(d) If this contract is terminated as provided in paragraph (a) of this clause,
the Government, in addition to any other rights provided in this clause, may
require the Contractor to transfer title and deliver to the Government, in the
manner and to the extent directed by the Contracting Officer, (i) any completed
supplies, and (ii) such partially completed supplies and materials, parts, tools,
dies, jigs, fixtures, plans, drawings, information, and contract rights (hereinafter
called "manufacturing materials") as the Contractor has specifically produced
or specifically acquired for the performance of such part of this contract as
has been terminated; and the Contractor shall, upon direction of the Con-
tracting Officer, protect and preserve property in possession of the Con-
tractor in which the Government has an interest. Payment for completed supplies
delivered to and accepted by the Government shall be at the contract price.
Payment for manufacturing materials delivered to and accepted by the Govern-
ment and for the protection and preservation of property shall be in an amount
agreed upon by the Contractor and Contracting Officer; failure to agree to such
amount shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of
the clause of this contract entitled "Dispute."
(e) If, after notice of termination of this contract under the provisions of
paragraph (a) of this clause, it is determined that the failure to perform this
contract is due to causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence
of the Contractor or subcontractor pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (c)
of this clause, such notice of default shall be deemed to have been issued pur-
suant to the clause of this contract entitled "Termination for Convenience of the
Government," and the rights and obligations of the parties hereto shall in such
event be governed by such clause. (Except as otherwise provided in this con-
tract, this paragraph (e) applies only if this contract contains such clause.)
(f) The rights and remedies of the Government provided in this clause shall
not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies provided
by law or under this contract.
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